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THE SEARCH FOR REASONABLENESS IN USE-
OF-FORCE CASES: UNDERSTANDING THE
EFFECTS OF STRESS ON PERCEPTION AND
PERFORMANCE
Seth D. DuCharnte*
INTRODUCTION
The man lunges from the shadows, his face contorted in anger. His
eyes lock with yours as he moves closer. His motion appears strange,
as if he is an image on a movie screen and the projector is off speed.
The background appears out of focus. The sights and sounds of the
world around you change abruptly, supplanted by the sensation of
your pounding heart. Your hands tremble. Time seems to slow down.
What you do in the next instant could mean the difference between
life and death.
Individuals who respond forcibly to such confrontations may face
the additional trauma of potential criminal and civil liability. In self-
defense and police use-of-force cases, liability turns on whether the
individual's response is legally justified. The issue of justification
arises in incidents ranging from street fights to police excessive force
to domestic violence cases. Each of these areas occupy the courts'
dockets, and society's attention.' When parties in such cases are
brought before a judge or jury, their actions are analyzed by some
version of what is commonly known as the "reasonable person"
standard.2 Determining what is or is not reasonable in a violent
confrontation, however, is a challenging endeavor.
* J.D. candidate 2003, Fordham University School of Law; former Deputy United
States Marshal, Eastern District of New York. I would like to thank Dyan Finguerra-
DuCharme for her unwavering support and for helping me find the path that lead to
this Note. I would also like to thank my father for teaching me about the relevance of
psychology at a very early age, and my mother for instilling in me an appreciation for
the craft of writing.
1. For example, the names Bernard Goetz, Rodney King, O2. Simpson, and
Amadou Diallo will not soon fade from public consciousness. While these cases are
distinct on their facts and involve numerous issues, they are each "use-of-force" cases,
focusing on questions about the dynamics and psychology of violence.
2- See Kevin Jon Heller, Beyond the Reasonable Man? A Synpathetic but
Critical Assessment of the Use of Subjective Standards of Reasonableness in Self-
Defense and Provocation Cases, 26 Am. J. Crim. L. 1, 1-5 (1998) (explaining variations
of the reasonable person standard in different jurisdictions); see also Victor E.
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Scientific studies show that high levels of stress dramatically affect
an individual's sensory perception and physical performance.'
Consultants and expert witnesses can help develop case strategies that
take into account perceptual distortions and performance limitations
bearing directly on the question of a defendant's reasonableness.'
While legal and practical obstacles exist, expert testimony can be
crucial in effectively presenting a defense of justification or excuse.'
When a jury is called on to judge the actions of a defendant in a use-
of-force scenario, objective, scientific evidence can provide
illuminating insight into the factors that affected the defendant's
conduct and may be invaluable in accurately assessing whether such
conduct was reasonable under the law.
Use of such evidence is currently the exception rather than the rule,
however, and the relevant experts, consultants, and scientific studies
may be unknown to most lawyers.6 By looking to the related fields of
psychology, neurology, ophthalmology, and motor-skills training, this
Note will address the dynamics in use-of-force incidents and suggest
ways in which lawyers litigating use-of-force cases can use consultants
and experts to bring this information to the jury. Furthermore, this
Note will argue that understanding perceptual and performance
factors is essential to a better understanding of culpability in use-of-
force cases.
Part I of this Note explains the legal standards and concepts
relevant to three common types of use-of-force cases, with an
emphasis on federal and New York law. First, Part I addresses the
Schwartz et al., Prosser, Wade & Schwartz's Torts: Cases and Materials 101-05 (10th
ed. 2000) (explaining that in civil cases criminal law rules for determining justification
are carried over and applied "without much variation").
3. See Bruce K. Siddle, Sharpening the Warrior's Edge: The Psychology and
Science of Training 76-77 (1995); see also Alexis Artwohl & Loren W. Christensen,
Deadly Force Encounters 39 (1997).
4. See Siddle, supra note 3, at 57.
5. See, e.g., Marie McCain, Experts' Opinions Sealed Verdict: Made Decision to
Acquit "Easier," Cincinnati Enquirer, Sept. 27, 2001, http://enquirer.comleditions/
2001/09/27/loc_experts.opinions.html (crediting testimony of optometrist and
psychologist as having persuaded jury to acquit police officer who shot unarmed
man); see also Robert E. Pierre, Officer is Acquitted in Killing that Led to Riots in
Cincinnati, Wash. Post, Sept. 27, 2001, at A2, 2001 WL 28359925 (describing general
circumstances of trial).
6. In researching this Note, the lawyers I spoke to were invariably surprised to
hear of the existence of this science and its application. Similarly, researchers such as
Dr. William Lewinski at Minnesota State University report that there is a relatively
small number of experts who regularly appear at trial to address these issues.
Telephone Interview with Dr. William Lewinski, Professor of Psychology, Minnesota
State University (Jan. 18, 2002) [hereinafter Lewinski Interview] (notes on file with
the Fordham Law Review]. Among reported cases, opinions mentioning incidents of
expert testimony about the specific perceptual and performance discussed herein are
rare, although there is documentation that such testimony has proven effective at
trial. See, e.g., McCain, supra note 5.
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law concerning a citizen's use of force in self-defense.7 Second, this
part explains some of the special issues that arise when the use of
force in question was by police officers.' Third, Part I recognizes
some of the unique challenges for courts and juries in determining
reasonableness in cases of domestic violence.' Finally, Part I explains
the general legal standards for the admissibility of expert witness
testimony.10
Part II explains the science behind perceptual, cognitive, and
physical functioning in what psychologists refer to as "high arousal"
states." By looking to psychological studies on survivors of deadly
force encounters,12 research into perception and cognition'3 and
developments in the field of motor-skills training, 4 this part offers a
practical perspective on the reasonableness tests and analytic models
presented in Part I. Part II suggests that correctly applying the
"reasonable belief' standard is much more complicated than the
simple statutory language implies.
Part III of this Note presents issues that arise in applying the
science to litigation, and addresses situations to which the science is
well suited. 5 This part also provides examples of cases where expert
testimony and consultation have proven invaluable in assisting
litigators. 6 Finally, this part argues that the application of scientific
research is critical to fairly and accurately analyzing human behavior
in use-of-force incidents, and perhaps all incidents where the parties
experience very high levels of stress.'7
I. LEGAL ANALYSES IN USE-OF-FORCE CASES
The areas of citizen self-defense, police use of force and domestic
violence each contain special issues that make them generally
distinguishable. The particular perspective of a robbery victim Vill
likely differ from that of an undercover police officer or a battered
spouse, because each will carry different experiences, abilities, and
responsibilities.18 The general fact pattern of each type of case will
7. See infra Part I.A-I.B.
8. See infra Part I.C.
9. See infra Part I.D.
10. See infra Part I.E.
11. Artwohl & Christensen, supra note 3. at 38.
12. See infra Part II.A.1.
13. See infra Part II.A.2.
14. See infra Part II.B.
15. See infra Part III.A.
16. See infra Part III.B-C.
17. See infra Part III.D.
18. The responsibilities and authority of the parties, in particular, may distinguish
the reasonableness of their actions. While the authority to arrest is given to citizens
by statute under certain limited circumstances, police officers' responsibilities to
apprehend subjects logically extend beyond those of citizens. In New York, for
example, a police officer may arrest an individual whom he or she reasonably believes
2002] 2517
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likely be quite different, as well. But when it comes to the critical
moment 9 when the individual must make a decision as to whether or
not to fight, the human elements and the legal concepts place them in
strikingly similar positions a.2  Despite their differences, all are human
beings who possess the same fundamental physiological and mental
attributes, and all are potentially culpable or liable for their use of
force. If the use of force results in litigation and the defense is
justification, the robbery victim, the police officer, and the battered
spouse will all be judged under some version of a "reasonableness"
test.2 If the fact that the defendant intentionally used force and
caused injury is undisputed, justification may be the only plausible
defense.2
This part explains the basic concept of legal justification in self-
defense cases, and address the effects of differing interpretations of
key statutory elements, such as imminence and retreat.2 3 Next, this
part explains how the formulation of jury instructions is critical to the
success or failure of a justification defense, and how a court's
erroneous denial of an instruction can be a winning argument on
appeal.2 4  This section then shifts to the related but specialized
concerns that arise in police use-of-force cases, including the defense
has committed an offense, while a citizen may only arrest a person if he or she knows
that person to be guilty of the offense. See N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law §§ 140.25-30
(McKinney 1998). Consequently, an officer might reasonably be expected to engage
a subject whom he did not know with certainty to be the perpetrator of a crime, while
a citizen is expected only to engage a wrongdoer "when the latter has in fact
committed [an] offense in his presence." Id. § 140.30(1)(b).
19. In this Note, the "critical moment" refers to the point in time when the totality
of the circumstances presents an actual or imminent use of force, for example the
emergence of a raised fist, drawn weapon, or similar apparent indicator that a threat
exists.
20. While different people will draw on different experiences in decision-making,
and the facts of each case will be different, the common factors will be involuntary
human stress responses, discussed infra Part II, and the law's reliance on the notion of
a "reasonable person" in judging their actions.
21. See generally Heller, supra note 2 (exploring philosophical and practical
concerns in applying subjective and objective standards of reasonableness in use-of-
force situations).
22. In New York, for example, the Penal Code describes the crime of assault in
plain language that seems to encompass generally and criminalize all acts of physical
violence against another person. Section 120.00 states simply: "A person is guilty of
assault.., when ... [w]ith intent to cause physical injury to another person, he causes
such injury." N.Y. Penal Law § 120.00 (McKinney 1998). Consequently, it is not
difficult to satisfy the elements of the charge of assault. Elsewhere, however, the
Penal Law addresses the defense of justification and calls upon the court to do a
balancing test with respect to the social value of an intentional use of force. Section
35.05 states, "conduct which would otherwise constitute an offense is justifiable and
not criminal when ... [s]uch conduct is necessary... to avoid an imminent public or
private injury .... Whenever evidence relating to the defense of justification... is
offered by the defendant, the court shall rule as a matter of law whether the claimed
facts and circumstances would, if established, constitute a defense." Id. § 35.05.
23. See infra Part I.A-I.B.1.
24. See infra Part I.B.2.
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of qualified immunity. ' This part briefly explores the problematic
tension between subjective and objective analyses in domestic
violence cases26 and raises questions about the circumstances of
domestic violence incidents that will be addressed in Part II. Finally,
this part addresses the standards for the admissibility of expert
witnesses.27
A. The Concept of Justification
Justification in use-of-force cases is typically self-defense, defense of
third parties, lawful arrest, or some combination thereof.' A
defendant is entitled to a justification charge if the jury could
reasonably find that his or her actions were appropriate under the
circumstances. 29  State use-of-force laws3" generally provide that an
individual may use force against another when he reasonably believes
25. See infra Part I.C.
26. See infra Part I.D.
27. See infra Part I.E.
28. See generally N.Y. Penal Law § 35.05 (McKinney 1998) (addressing
circumstances where citizens and law enforcement officers may use force to protect
themselves, innocent third parties, or to affect arrest); Heller, supra note 2
(addressing premise of social utility inherent in permissibility of using force in self
defense); V.F. Nourse, Self-Defense and Subjecti'itv., 68 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1235 (2001)
(reviewing history and evolution of justification defense and application of analytic
standards).
29. See, e.g., People v. Mothon, 729 N.Y.S.2d 541, 543 (App. Div. 2001) ("As a
general proposition, a justification charge is proper when, viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to the defendant, the jury, based upon a reasonable view of the
evidence, could find that the defendant's acts were justified.").
30. See, e.g., N.Y. Penal Law § 35.15.
A person may, subject to [provisions], use physical force upon another
person when and to the extent he reasonably believes such to be necessary
to defend himself or a third person from what he reasonably believes to be
the use or imminent use of unlawful physical force .... A person may not
use deadly physical force... unless: (a) He reasonably believes that such
other person is using or about to use deadly physical force ....
Id. (emphasis added); see also State v. Romley, 836 P.2d 445, 451 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1992) (noting state statute provides that "a person is justified in using physical force
against another when and to the extent that a reasonable person would believe that
physical force is immediately necessary to protect oneself .... "); People v. Miller, 981
P.2d 654, 658 (Colo. Ct. App. 1998) (noting Colorado self-defense statute allows that
a person "may use a degree of force which he reasonably believes to be necessary");
State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 373 (N.J. 1984) ("The use of force against another in self-
defense is justifiable 'when the actor reasonably believes that such force is
immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting himself against the use of
unlawful force....'); Commonwealth v. Galloway, 485 A.2d 776, 782 n.3 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1984) ("[U]se of force upon... another... is justifiable when the actor believes
that such force is immediately necessary .... "); State v. Janes, 822 P.2d 1238, 1242
(Wash. Ct. App. 1992) ("Washington uses a subjective standard... requir[ing] the
court and the jury [to] evaluate the reasonableness of the defendant's perception of
the imminence of... danger in light of all the facts and circumstances known to the
defendant .... " (citing State v. Wanrow, 559 P.2d 548, 556 (Wash. 1977))).
20021 2519
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he is threatened with imminent,31 unlawful force and cannot retreat
safely.32 Statutes also permit the use of force to prevent what the
defendant reasonably believes is the commission of a serious violent
crime, such as a rape or robbery,33 or to effect arrest after the
commission of a crime.
4
Even if some use of force is shown to be justified, the defendant will
not prevail if the fact-finder determines that the amount of force used
was unreasonable. But unreasonable to whom? Different
individuals may have different opinions and beliefs about what
behavior constitutes an appropriate action in response to a perceived
threat. Additionally, the defendant's state of mind may be relevant to
excusing otherwise culpable behavior. 6
31. The concept of imminence is open to some exploration, especially in domestic
violence cases where a party may perceive that harm will come to her if she does not
take pro-active measures. See Erica Beecher-Monas, Domestic Violence: Competing
Conceptions of Equality in the Law of Evidence, 47 Loy. L. Rev. 81, 100-05 (2001).
32. See N.Y. Penal Law § 35.15(2)(a) (a person "may not use deadly physical force
if he knows that he can [retreat] with complete safety" (emphasis added)). This notion
of a duty to retreat should be considered carefully. If the defendant knew he could
retreat in complete safety, and did not, justification will not be available if the
defendant used deadly force. See, e.g., Davis v. Strack, 270 F.3d 111, 130 (2d Cir. 2001)
(holding that there is no duty to retreat if a person reasonably perceives himself to be
"one or two seconds" from death and the act of retreating could put him in more
danger); In re Y.K., 663 N.E.2d. 313, 314 (N.Y. 1996) (holding no duty to retreat
arises until threat of deadly force exists).
33. See, e.g., N.Y. Penal Law § 35.15(2)(b) (stating a person may use deadly
physical force if "[h]e reasonably believes that such other person is committing or
attempting to commit a kidnapping, forcible rape, forcible sodomy or robbery; or (c)
[hie reasonably believes that such other person is committing or attempting to commit
a burglary..." (emphasis added)).
34. See id. § 35.30 (addressing "[j]ustification; use of physical force in making an
arrest or in preventing escape"). Note that, under section 35.30(4)(b), a private
person acting on his or her own account may use deadly physical force to effect the
arrest of a person who has committed a rape, robbery, or other listed violent crime.
35. See, e.g., Unites States v. Livoti, 22 F. Supp. 2d 235, 239-40 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)
(describing and analyzing the evidence against a police officer convicted of
involuntary manslaughter for an unreasonable application of a choke hold).
36. The legal defense of excuse focuses not on the defendant's willful intent, but
instead on his or her loss of self-control. In a discussion of the analytic standards in
self-defense cases, one commentator observes that excuse "rests on the assumption
that either internal pressures... or external pressures.., might so intrude on the
actor's freedom of choice that the act committed under pressure no longer appears to
be his doing." See Heller, supra note 2, at 23 (citations omitted) (alterations in
original); see also Beecher-Monas, supra note 31, at 82 n.3 ("The distinction between
justification and excuse is 'between warranted action and unwarranted action for
which the actor is not to blame' [but] the distinction between justification and excuse
is incoherent because in both instances the result is legal exoneration." (quoitng Kent
Greenawalt, The Perplexing Borders of Justification and Excuse, 84 Colum. L. Rev.
1897, 1927 (1984))). The performance and perceptual factors addressed herein may
constitute the pressures necessary to establish a credible excuse to otherwise culpable
behavior, because they are sometimes so severe as to virtually divorce a person from
his or her faculties.
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A few courts rely on a subjective standard, crediting an individual's
own personal belief as opposed to the belief of a hypothetical
"reasonable person" in his or her position.-7  Under a subjective
standard, the defendant need only show that he ..did honestly believe
it necessary to use force in his own defense."'" Most American
courts, however, have traditionally relied on an objective standard.39
Under an objective standard of reasonableness, the question is
"'whether a reasonable person in [the] defendant's circumstances
would have perceived self-defense as necessary.'"" Under either
standard, though, a justification argument depends on a credible
presentation of evidence from which the trier of fact can infer a belief
that force was, in fact, a necessary response, a judgment question with
considerable room for uncertainty given the chaotic and unpredictable
nature of use-of-force events.
B. Self Defense on the Street
1. The Reasonableness Test: Objective or Subjective?
When individuals clash, society is often wary of the underlying
motivations that result in violence.4' For example, courts have taken
care to try to separate legal justification from an individual's own
personal notion of street justice. In the notorious case of People v.
Goetz," the New York Court of Appeals addressed the sometimes
murky line between subjective and objective standards for evaluating
appropriate responses in self-defense situations. The distinction
between the two standards played a critical role in the case.
Goetz was initially charged with attempted murder, assault, and
possession of an unlicensed handgun in connection with his shooting
of four young men on a New York City subway. " When the men
demanded that Goetz give them five dollars, he shot and seriously
wounded them.' Goetz was ultimately arrested and charged for his
37. Heller, supra note 2, at 56-57.
3A Id. at 56 (quoting Moor v. Licciardello, 463 A.2d 268,272 (Del. 1983)).
39. See id. at 4. Heller explains that, while the objective standard is the most
prevalent, there is an increasing trend for courts to consider subjective factors with
respect to a particular defendant. Heller divides the inquiries into four distinct
reasonableness standards: the objective standard, the purely subjective standard, the
Model Penal Code standard, and what he calls the "particularizing standard." Id. at 5.
40. Id. at 8 (quoting State v. Stewart, 763 P.2d 572,579 (Kan. 1988)).
41. In many notable use-of-force cases, justification is clouded by societal issues
such as race and class. See, e.g., People v. Powell, 283 Cal. Rptr. 777 (Ct. App. 1991)
(the Rodney King case); People v. Goetz, 497 N.E. 2d 41 (N.Y. 1986); People v. Boss,
701 N.Y.S.2d 342 (App. Div. 1999) (shooting of Amadou Diallo).
42. 497 N.E.2d 41 (N.Y. 1986).
43. Id. at 43.
44. Id. at 44. Goetz reportedly told investigators that one of the assailants -tried
to run through the wall of the train, but... he had nowhere to go." Id. (alteration in
2002] 2521
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conduct. The charges against Goetz, however, were initially dismissed
because the prosecutor introduced an "objective element" when he
explained the charges to the grand jury.45 The prosecutor instructed
the grand jurors to consider "whether Goetz's conduct was that of a
'reasonable man in [Goetz's] situation."'46 The remark was nearly
fatal to the prosecution's case. Ruling that justification depended
solely on the subjective beliefs of the defendant under the
circumstances, the lower court found that the prosecutor's reference
to a "reasonable man" was unlawful and dismissed the charges against
Goetz.47
After an illuminating discussion of the legislative history of the
justification statute,48 the New York State Court of Appeals reversed
the lower court's dismissal of the charges, rejecting the notion that
justification depends only on the particular beliefs of the defendant.4 9
Instead, the court noted that the legislature had included the language
"reasonably believes" and not merely "believes" when considering the
perceptions of the defendant, thus requiring that justification hinge on
an objective element.5 Otherwise, the court admonished, justification
could arise from a belief "based upon mere fear or fancy or remote
hearsay information or a delusion pure and simple." 5'
The Court of Appeals emphasized that the modifier "reasonable" in
the statutory language amounted to a requirement for an objective
analysis of the defendant's belief" and noted that other states had
similarly interpreted such statutory language. 3 Goetz had argued that
an objective analysis would unfairly preclude a jury from considering
factors with regard to "the actual circumstances of a particular
incident," such as Geotz's own history of victimization. 4 The court
concluded, to the contrary, that reliance on an objective standard
would not preclude consideration of "the background and other
relevant characteristics of a particular actor."".
The court emphasized the relevance of factors and circumstances
"more than the physical movements of the potential assailant...
original).
45. Id. at 46.
46. Id. (alteration in original).
47. Id.
48. See id at 48-49.
49. Id. at 52-53.
50. Id. at 47.
51. Id. at 48 (quotations omitted).
52. Id. at 50.
53. Id. at 51 ("Numerous decisions from other States interpreting 'reasonably
believes' in justification statutes enacted subsequent to the drafting of the Model
Penal Code are consistent... as they hold that such language refers to what a
reasonable person could have believed under the same circumstances." (citations
omitted)).
54. Id. at 52.
55. Id.
2522 [Vol. 70
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[and] the physical attributes of all persons involved, including the
defendant." 6 Ultimately, the court concluded that the jury's analysis
of the defendant's conduct should incorporate both subjective
elements unique to the defendant and objective elements of the
"reasonable person."5 The jury should first determine "whether the
defendant had the requisite beliefs" to establish justification, and
second whether a reasonable person could have held those beliefs
under the circumstances."8
In light of the preceding analytical concerns, it is clear that, in
planning a litigation strategy, a lawyer needs a sense of whether the
facts of the case can reasonably be shown to justify the defendant's
conduct. Essential to the success of the defense of justification is a
court's willingness to issue an appropriate jury instruction that will
shape the jury's analysis of the facts. If justification is the only
plausible defense to a charge or claim against a defendant who used
force, then the formulation of the jury instructions may be dispositive.
An inquiry into how the court makes a determination as to whether to
charge the jury on justification, and what constitutes reversible error,
is useful to flesh out the elements of a justification defense at trial, or
on appeal, in use-of-force cases.
2. The Critical Role of the Jury Instruction
In Davis v. Strack,59 the Second Circuit recently examined the
standards of justification in self-defense cases under New York law.
In that case, Ronald Davis appealed the denial of a writ of habeas
corpus by the United States District Court in the Southern District of
New York. Defendant's appeal raised the question of "whether a trial
judge's denial of a jury instruction on justification for the use of
deadly force requires that the petitioner's convictions... be set
aside."'
In Davis, the Second Circuit carefully analyzed the legal and
practical issues that play out in a court's determination of whether a
jury instruction on self defense is warranted. The case involved a
shooting in northern Manhattan, where a young numbers runner shot
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. The Court of Appeals' analysis is important to the present discussion
because perceptual distortions could be deemed the "mere fear or fancy" peculiar of
one particular defendant unless the distortions are presented as factors that would be
experienced not only by the defendant, but also by a reasonable person under the
circumstances. If perceptual distortions can be shown to be common, human
experiences, then evidence of perceptual distortions is relevant to both subjective and
objective inquiries.
59. 270 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2001) (seeking federal relief from state court conviction
for manslaughter and weapons possession, based on lower court's failure to allow jury
instruction on justification).
60. Id at 116.
2002] 2523
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and killed a career criminal who had repeatedly victimized him in the
past.61 The shooter was charged and convicted of manslaughter in a
trial in which the jury heard no instruction on justification.62 Granting
habeas review, the Second Circuit explored the state court's findings
with respect to the petitioner's perceptions and beliefs at the time of
the shooting, as well as his duty to retreat under the New York penal
code.63
The facts of Davis describe a tragic and violent relationship
between the defendant and the man he shot, a neighborhood bully'
known as "Bubblegum."65 According to the trial record, Bubblegum
was "a six foot tall, 435-pound felon [who] had robbed, raped, and
beaten.., people," including Davis. 6 Davis made a habit of avoiding
Bubblegum, and had already ducked him once on the day of the
shooting.67 Seeing his tormentor was not without effect, however.
Out of fear of a possible encounter with Bubblegum, Davis obtained a
handgun.' On their next encounter, which occurred later the same
day on a street they both frequented, Davis was armed.69 When
Bubblegum approached Davis and reached toward his waistband,
Davis shot and killed him, believing that Bubblegum was carrying a
gun and intended to shoot him.7" "Stricken with panic and hoping to
beat [Bubblegum] to the draw, Davis ran.., behind Bubblegum and
shot him several times in the back."'" Davis's perceptions turned out
to be not entirely correct-Bubblegum was armed not with a gun, as
Davis believed, but with a carpet knife.72
The Appellate Division of New York had found that the trial court
properly refused to charge the jury on self defense because Davis
"offered no convincing reason why he did not retreat from the scene
at the time of the actual shooting"'73 and because "there [was] no
objective view of the evidence under which the defendant could have
had a reasonable belief that there was an imminent danger. '74 The
state court found that the duty to retreat arose when Davis first saw
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. See id. at 121 n.3 (summarizing analysis of New York Appellate Division as
focusing on issues of reasonable belief and duty to retreat).
64. See id. at 117. The Court noted that the victim had a reputation for violence
and that Davis knew of this reputation. Id.
65. Id. at 116. Bubblegum's real name was Eddie Ray Leonard, but the Second
Circuit consistently referred to him by his nickname.
66. Id. at 129.
67. Id. at 119.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 120.
71. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 130 (citing People v. Davis, 648 N.Y.S.2d 79, 80 (App. Div. 1996)).
74. Id. at 131 n.7.
2524 [Vol. 70
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Bubblegum earlier that day,75 and that the fact that Davis had not
actually seen a gun was damning. 6 The court explained:
Essentially, the trial judge's view was that, once Davis had seen
Bubblegum on Amsterdam Avenue, knowing of Bubblegum's past
violence and his threat of future violence, he could not return with a
gun to Amsterdam Avenue where Bubblegum was without violating
the duty to retreat specified [under New York law]. Having failed to
retreat when he had the opp ortunity, Davis was not entitled to raise
the defense of justification.
Without the benefit of the self-defense charge that the defense was
counting on,7 8 Davis was convicted of manslaughter.79
Davis claimed that the failure to charge the jury on justification
amounted to a constitutional violation of due process." In analyzing
whether a constitutional violation had taken place, the Second Circuit
had to determine whether the justification charge was required by
New York law.8 The Second Circuit noted, "if the record includes
evidence which, viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant
and drawing all reasonably permissible inferences in his favor, satisfies
the essential elements of the defense of justification, the charge must
be given. '
The court determined that a justification charge would be required
if the defendant had a reasonable belief that another person was using
or was about to use deadly physical force against him -  The
defendant would have a duty to retreat, however, if he knew he could
"retreat with complete safety" from the imminent threat.' The court
then reviewed the facts to see if Davis had a basis for such a
reasonable belief about the imminence of a deadly threat and whether
he has an opportunity to retreat which he neglected.'
The Second Circuit found that Davis had good reason to believe
that Bubblegum was armed and coming to kill him.' On the question
of whether the perceived threat was imminent, the court observed
that, at the time of the shooting, "[i]f Davis's reasonable belief that
75. Id-
76. See id. at 130.
77. Id. at 120.
78. Id. ("Defense counsel protested that he had prepared his summation to rely
on a justification defense and that the court had never previously indicated that it
would not charge on the defense of justification.").
79. Id.
80. Id. at 122.
81. Id. at 124.
82. Id at 125.
83. Id
84. Id. at 126.
85. Id.
86. See id at 130 ("On all this evidence [of Davis's knowledge of Bubblegum], we
think it was undisputably reasonable for Davis to believe that within a second,
Bubblegum's gun would once again be pointing at him, and he would be dead.").
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Bubblegum had a gun had been correct, he had one or two seconds
left to live."'  The court noted that, under New York law, once the
belief is established as reasonable, it does not have to be correct.88
Having found that Davis's belief was reasonable under the
circumstances, the court judged him as if he had been correct in his
mistaken belief that Bubblegum had a gun and meant to shoot him. 9
The court seemed to take no special notice of the fact that Davis shot
Bubblegum in the back.' Because force was justified, the particular
manner in which it was applied (i.e. the trajectory of the bullets) did
not preclude a justification defense."
Given the nature of the perceived threat (an assailant armed with a
handgun), the court found Davis under no legal obligation to retreat.92
The Second Circuit determined that the duty to retreat arose only
when the threat was imminent and when the retreat could be made in
"complete safety. '93 The court reasoned that because "Davis could
not have fled without offering his back as an easy target," he was
under no duty to retreat.94 The court explained:
The jury could have found that, when Davis had the opportunity to
retreat from the scene in safety, he was not yet threatened with
imminent use of deadly force. But when the time came that he
reasonably believed Bubblegum was about to shoot him, it was no
longer possible for him to retreat in safety.95
As a practical matter, Davis stands for the proposition that the duty
to retreat will rarely arise when the defendant reasonably perceives a
threat, as the duty depends on both the imminence of the threat and
the condition that the defendant could knowingly escape in complete
safety.96 Where firearms are present (or even believed to be present,
as in Davis), or a disparity in size, strength, and speed exists, it is hard
to conceive of circumstances where a defendant could know that
87. Id.
88. Id. (citing People v. Desmond, 460 N.Y.S.2d 619, 620 (App. Div. 1983)
(finding that the "question is not whether the defendant was 'in actual peril of his
life,' but whether 'he reasonably believed he was in such peril').
89. Id. (crediting Davis's testimony that he did not flee because he was afraid
Bubblegum would shoot him in the back).
90. See id. at 120.
91. Rounds striking the side and back are often the result of subject body
movement. See Bill Lewinski, Why Is the Suspect Shot in the Back?, Police Marksman,
Nov.-Dec. 2000, at 20. Here, however, the testimony was clear that the defendant ran
behind his intended target before opening fire. See Davis, 270 F.3d at 120.
Apparently, the court found this flanking maneuver a reasonable tactic once the
defendant established the necessity to use deadly force.
92. Davis, 270 F.3d at 130.
93. Id. (citing N.Y. Penal Law § 35.15(2)(a) (McKinney 1998)).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.; N.Y. Penal Law § 35.15 ("[T]he actor may not use deadly physical force if
he knows that he can with complete safety as to himself and others avoid the necessity
[of using deadly force] by retreating.").
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escape was a safe alternative to an effective counter-strike. In Davis,
the Second Circuit ultimately concluded that, given the facts in the
record, Davis was entitled to a jury instruction on justification and
that the denial of the instruction did amount to a denial of due
process.97
Davis is a valuable case for the purposes of the present discussion
because it addresses several critical concepts in use-of-force litigation.
First, the case provides a concrete example of facts and circumstances
in an actual use-of-force incident. Second, it emphasizes the flexible
but correspondingly uncertain application of the "reasonable person"
standard, considering that several state and federal courts had
affirmed the trial court's analysis before the Second Circuit reversed."
Third, the case provides a good example of the blending of statutory
interpretation and case law analysis that will be inevitable in use-of-
force litigation. Finally, Davis offers insight into the last chance,
federal remedy of habeas relief for a wrongful conviction. While the
specific statutes and case law will of course vary by jurisdiction, Davis
provides a practical context for the the concepts of perception, belief,
reasonableness, and imminence that will be analyzed in Parts II and
III of this Note.
C. Special Concerns in Police Use-of-Force Cases
A use of force against a person is generally considered unlawful if it
is unreasonable. When the police use force against a person, such as
in the detention or arrest of a suspect,99 additional issues arise."
Excessive force, the most common form of police misconduct,"" may
be prosecuted as a crime or, more commonly, may be actionable as a
civil wrong."° For this reason, courts may conduct several inquiries
97. See Davis, 270 F3d at 132 ("We are confident that this error had such
enormous practical importance for Davis's conviction on the homicide charge that it
must be considered a violation of due process.").
98. Id. at 121-22 (reviewing procedural history of the case, including conviction of
defendant at state trial level, denial of appeal by New York Court of Appeals, denial
of habeas petition on the merits by federal magistrate and federal district court in the
Southern District of New York).
99. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989) (holding that -[excessive
force] claims are properly analyzed under the Fourth Amendment's 'objective
reasonableness' standard"); see also Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985)
(holding that the use of deadly force against a fleeing felon is unlawful unless the
suspect poses an imminent danger to the officer or another).
100. See J. Michael McGuinness, Shootings by Police Officers are Analyzed Under
Standards Based on Objective Reasonableness, N.Y. St. B.J., Sept. 2000, at 17
[hereinafter McGuinness, Shootings] ("Because of the unique law enforcement
context, a special set of rules has emerged that is substantially different from ordinary
tort and criminal law principles.").
101. See id. at 17 & n.5 (citing Gillespie et al., Police Use of Force (1998)).
102. See Samuel D. Faulkner, Ohio Peace Officer Training Commission. Use of
Force: Decision Making and Legal Precedence 8 ("[Olfficers found to use excessive
force either sadistically, frivolously, or while not on duty are subject to criminal
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unique to police use-of-force cases. This part will address some of
these inquiries, including: (1) protections for arrestees under the
Fourth Amendment and federal statutes; (2) special protections for
police officers, such as qualified immunity; and (3) the application of
criminal and civil statutes.
1. Application of the Objective Reasonableness Standard
In addition to the issues of imminence and reasonable perception of
danger discussed earlier, police use-of-force cases may also involve an
inquiry into the severity of the suspected crime for which a person is
being apprehended, and whether the suspect is resisting or attempting
to resist arrest.1 °3 While police use-of-force incidents can involve
complex webs of overlapping charges1" and jurisdictions, 105 "[t]he
common thread that runs throughout these liability theories is the
objective reasonableness standard.""° The objective standard looks
not at what was in the mind of the particular officer, but whether the
officer's conduct reflected what a hypothetical reasonable officer
would have done under the same circumstances. 10 7
One of the paramount legal vehicles for vindicating the rights of
victims of police abuse is an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.10 The
statute provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of
Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
sanctions." (citing Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973))). Faulkner
suggests that civil remedies are more common than criminal sanctions against officers
because there are three formidable obstacles to criminal prosecution of police
officers. Id. "First, suits are screened by a prosecutor with whom the credibility of the
plaintiff pales in comparison with that of the officer. Second.... there is a reluctance
of witnesses of fellow officers to come forth due to fear of reprisals. And finally,....
the public is generally unwilling to punish the police with penalties normally reserved
for criminals." Id.; see also id. at 9 (addressing prevalence of civil suits against police
departments).
103. McGuinness, Shootings, supra note 100, at 17 & n.10 (citing Lennon v. Miller,
66 F.3d 416,420 (2d Cir. 1995)).
104. See id. at 20 n.25 ("Virtually every conceivable legal theory and prospective
legal cause of action available in tort, civil rights and constitutional law is readily
applicable to law enforcement officers in their daily duties." (citing Avery et al.,
Police Misconduct: Law and Litigation (3d ed. 1999))).
105. Federal civil rights charges may be brought against police officers subsequent
to or concurrent with state prosecutions. See, e.g., Powell v. Superior Court, 283
Cal.Rptr. 777, 779 (Ct. App. 1991) (discussing state charges against police officers
involved in Rodney King incident); Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 89 (1996)
(addressing the procedural history of the federal prosecution arising from the Rodney
King incident).
106. McGuinness, Shootings, supra note 100, at 18 (emphasis added).
107. See supra Part I.B.1 (explaining the difference between objective and
subjective inquiries).
108. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2001).
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deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured .... 109
When police officers, acting "under color" of law, wrongfully detain
or otherwise injure people, § 1983 can provide relief. Given the
generality of the statute, however, the analysis by which courts
determine the violation has evolved considerably through case law.
In Graham v. Connor, the Supreme Court held that § 1983 claims
for excessive force are "properly analyzed under the Fourth
Amendment's 'objective reasonableness' standard.""'" Graham
concerned an incident where a police officer detained a diabetic who
had been behaving suspiciously in and around a convenience store.,
The diabetic's pleas for sugar or juice went unheeded by the officers,
who believed he was drunk."2 During the investigative stop, the
suspect sustained numerous physical injuries, some of which resulted
from being pushed face down onto the hood of a car."3 After
detaining Graham, police officers released him, lacking any probable
cause to arrest.
11 4
In analyzing the excessive force claim in Graham, the Court
rejected a "generic standard"'1 5 of reasonableness for claims brought
under § 1983.116 Rather, the Court extended the holding in Tennessee
v. Garner,"7 the seminal case on the use of deadly force by police, to
cases where where police used non-deadly force."S Garner held that
the apprehension of a suspect by the use of deadly force is a seizure
properly analyzed under the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness
test.119 In examining the reasonableness of such a use of force, the
Court evaluated the officer's actions with a balancing test, weighing
the "'nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth
Amendment interests' against the countervailing governmental
interests at stake.""12 In Graham, recognizing that the reasonableness
analysis is "not capable of precise definition,'' the Court explained
that a "proper application requires careful attention to the facts and
109. Id-
110. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386,388 (1989).
111. Id. at 388-90.
112- See id at 389 (noting that one officer remarked, -I've seen a lot of people with
sugar diabetes that never acted like this. Ain't nothing wrong with the M.F. but
drunk").
113. See id. at 389-90 ("Graham sustained a broken foot, cuts on his wrists, a
bruised forehead, and an injured shoulder .....
114. Id at 389.
115. Id- at 393.
116. Id. at 393-94.
117. 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
118. Graham, 490 U.S. at 395.
119. Garner, 471 U.S. at 7.
120. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (quoting Garner, 471 U.S. at 8).
121. Id at 396 (internal quotations omitted).
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circumstances of each particular case."' The Court rejected the
notion that the officer's personal motivations were dispositive, instead
employing an objective analysis."u The inquiry turned on whether the
officer's actions were objectively reasonable.1 24 Consequently, under
Graham, police conduct in all use-of-force incidents is analyzed under
a balancing test that is objective, yet flexible enough to take into
account the wide variety of factors and circumstances under which
such incidents arise."2
2. Qualified Immunity
The application of an objective inquiry into reasonableness is a
common legal principle in use-of-force cases.1 26  Police incidents,
however, involve additional legal claims and defenses which set them
apart from civilian self-defense cases. 27 While police officers are
subject to federal claims like a § 1983 action, they are also entitled to
increased protections from such liability. Officers, as government
officials, have the opportunity to defeat claims before trial by invoking
qualified immunity, a defense that deserves attention because it also
incorporates a reasonableness analysis.1 28  Unlike the defense of
justification, "the privilege [of invoking qualified immunity] is an
immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability."'129 While a
court considers the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff in a
qualified immunity analysis, 3 ' "qualified immunity protects 'all but
the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law."'' 131
Qualified immunity protects individual officers from liability in
performing discretionary functions "unless such conduct violates a
clearly established constitutional or statutory right of which a
reasonable person would have known."' 32  At the threshold, the
122. Id. (citing Garner, 471 U.S. at 8-9) (noting that "the question is 'whether the
totality of the circumstances justifie[s] a particular sort of... seizure').
123. Id. at 397 ("An officer's evil intentions will not make a Fourth Amendment
violation out of an objectively reasonable use of force; nor will an officer's good
intentions make an objectively unreasonable use of force constitutional." (citing Scott
v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978))).
124. Id.
125. See id.
126. McGuinness, Shootings, supra note 100, at 17.
127. Id.
128. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200 (2001) ("Qualified immunity is 'an
entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation."' (quoting
Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985))).
129. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 200-01; see also Wyche v. City of Franklinton, 837 F. Supp.
137, 141 (E.D.N.C. 1993) ("Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense available to
governmental officials which shields them from personal liability in § 1983 actions."
(citing Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987))).
130. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201.
131. Id. at 202 (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)).
132. Jackson v. City of Bremerton, 268 F.3d 646, 650-51 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing
Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640).
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plaintiff must demonstrate that the officer violated a constitutional
right of the plaintiff."' If the court finds that a violation occurred,
"the second inquiry is whether the officer could nevertheless have
reasonably but mistakenly believed that his or her conduct did not
violate a clearly established constitutional right."'3- If the officer's
mistake was reasonable, the officer is not liable.'35
In examining the officer's conduct, the court judges "from the
perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene rather than with the
20/20 vision of hindsight." 6 Hence, the court employs an objective
analysis rather than a subjective consideration of the particular
officer's intent. Although this delicate inquiry is often considered to
be a question of fact for the jury, the issue may be decided as a matter
of law if, "in resolving all factual disputes in favor of the plaintiff, the
officer's force was 'objectively reasonable."'t37
It is important to emphasize that the perception of danger, not the
actual existence of a threat, is the critical issue in determining whether
an officer is entitled to the protection of qualified immunity.'3- The
reasonableness analysis allows for a balanced consideration of the
factors affecting the officer on the scene. The Supreme Court has
recognized that the chaotic circumstances under which use-of-force
decisions are made are particularly challenging and should be
considered in any inquiry into the reasonableness of the officer's
conduct.139 While the test is objective on its face, it still takes into
account the uniquely difficult perspective of the actor and the
variables inevitably surrounding the use-of-force incident.'
133. A qualified immunity analysis is conducted in a light most favorable to the
party asserting the violation. Id. The inquiry begins by asking whether the officer's
conduct violated a constitutional right. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-22 (1968)).
137. Id. at n.1 (citing Scott v. Henrich, 39 F.3d 912,915 (9th Cir. 1994)).
138. See Davis v. Freels, 583 F.2d 337, 341 (7th Cir. 1978) ("[I]t is not necessary
that the danger which gave rise to the belief actually existed: it is sufficient that the
person resorting to self-defense at the time involved reasonably believed in the
existence of such a danger, and such reasonable belief is sufficient even where it is
mistaken." (internal citations omitted)).
139. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396-97 (1989) ("The calculus of
reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often
forced to make split-second judgments-in circumstances that are tense, uncertain,
and rapidly evolving-about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular
situation.").
140. In reviewing each case, the court considers: "(1) the severity of the crime in
question; (2) the apparent threat posed by the suspect; (3) whether the suspect was
trying to resist or flee; and (4) whether the situation was judged from the perspective
of a reasonable officer coping with a tense, fast evolving situation." Faulkner, supra
note 102, at 14.
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3. Apparent Danger Distinguished from Actual Danger
Because a police officer's actions based on a reasonable but
mistaken perception about the danger of a situation can cause serious
injury to the person being subdued,141 the question of what constitutes
objectively reasonable apparent danger, as opposed to actual danger,
is central to understanding how to litigate successfully police
excessive-force cases.1 42  The "tense, uncertain, and rapidly
evolving"'143  circumstances surrounding use-of-force incidents
routinely give rise to conduct that is readily questioned in hindsight. 4
In developing a plausible justification defense, then, it is critical to
recognize the inherent disparity between the perspective of a
detached third party, i.e., a juror, and a defendant who has had
141. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 205 (2001) ("If an officer reasonably, but
mistakenly, believed that a suspect was likely to fight back, for instance, the officer
would be justified in using more force than in fact was needed."); see also Wyche v.
City of Franklinton, 837 F. Supp. 137, 142-43 (E.D.N.C. 1993). In Wyche, a mentally
disturbed man chased a police officer around a parking lot, screaming at the officer
that he was going to kill him. Id. at 139. When the officer perceived that Wyche was
three to five feet away and "reach[ing] behind him as he lunged forward," the officer
fired two shots, killing the suspect. Id. at 140. Wyche turned out to be unarmed, and
the officer was sued under § 1983. Id. at 139. In analyzing the reasonableness of the
officer's conduct, the court rejected an affidavit by a criminal justice instructor that
argued that "[a] reasonable law enforcement officer would have known that a person
experiencing abnormal psychological behavior and who did not have a weapon in his
possession would not present an imminent threat to his life which necessitated the use
of deadly force." Id. at 142 (citations omitted). Instead, the court found that the
officer's perception of apparent danger justified his conduct. Id. at 143.
142. Courts increasingly employ a "could have believed" standard in analyzing the
reasonableness of an officer's conduct, including reliance on the concept of "apparent
danger" as opposed to "actual danger." See J. Michael McGuinness, Judging Split-
Second Decisions, Police, Jan. 2000, at 58.
143. Graham, 490 U.S. at 397.
144. One controversial incident offering a rare glimpse into the ugly shadows of
violence was the video that turned into the series of cases that came to be known as
the "Rodney King cases." See Powell v. Superior Court, 283 Cal.Rptr. 777 (Ct. App.
1991). Michael Stone, defense counsel for one of the four police officers involved in
the incident, has argued that the videotape was misleading and that it was King's
behavior that determined the conduct of the officers. Stone argues that, in light of
King's behavior, the officers' use of force was not excessive, but gave the appearance
of being so because it consisted of a regrettable but not unlawful series of ineffective
blows.
What we see on the video is the result of improperly applied force. Most of
the baton blows had no power, were glancing blows, or missed
completely.... What lay people see as a "beating," police force experts
describe as a classic example of improperly executed use of force.... If the
force was unreasonable, it was unreasonable because it wasn't enough to
quickly immobilize King.
Michael P. Stone, Legal Affairs Council, Against All Odds: The Trials of Officer
Laurence Powell (1995). Stone's defense was successful against the state charges, but
two of the officers were ultimately convicted of federal civil rights violations. See
Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81 (1996).
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training or experiences that will inevitably and profoundly shape that
person's perceptions.' 5
One of the most controversial police use-of-force cases to arise in
recent years was the shooting of an unarmed immigrant, Amadou
Diallo, by four members of the New York City Police Department's
Street Crime Unit." The shooting occurred when the officers
attempted to stop and question Diallo because his behavior raised the
officers' suspicion. 47  Diallo, who unfortunately matched the
description of a serial rapist who had been victimizing the
neighborhood, was standing in the dimly lit vestibule of his Bronx
apartment building a little after midnight when the officers
approached. I" According to the officers, they displayed their badges
and announced their identity as they approached Diallo on the steps
of his building.149 When Officers Carroll and McMellon were only a
step or two away, pursuing Diallo into the small vestibule of the
apartment building, Diallo reached into his pocket and withdrew a
black wallet."'s Officer Carroll, alarmed by Diallo's motion, shouted
"Gun!" Officer McMellon took a step backwards, falling down the
vestibule stairs. t5' Which of the four officers fired the first round is
uncertain, but in the next few seconds they together fired a total of
forty-one rounds, at least nineteen of which struck Diallo as he stood
in the narrow hall.'52 With flashes of muzzle blast bouncing off the
reflective paint of the door, and the officers' own rounds ricocheting
back at them, the chaos that erupted in those few seconds left the
officers bewildered, seemingly under attack, and the young immigrant
dying on the steps of his home.'53
According to the officers, while one officer ran to the fallen
McMellon, screaming "Where are you hit?" Officer Carroll, the
closest to Diallo, looked down with horror at the wallet in the hand of
the mortally wounded figure. 54 Reaction to the incident by the public
and the Bronx District Attorney's Office was swift and damning.' 5
145. Additionally, prevalent dramatizations of law enforcement officers in film and
television may detrimentally influence jurors' expectations of appropriate police
conduct.
146. See Cathy Burke, Cops Gun Down Unarmed Man-41 Bullets Fired at Bx.
"Suspect", N.Y. Post, Feb. 5, 1999, at 4, 1999 WL 3719569; Rafael A. Olmeda & John
Marzuli, Cops Blast Unarmed Man Fusillade Kills Bx. Peddler in Mystery
Confrontation, N.Y. Daily News, Feb. 5, 1999, at 4, 1999 WL 3424413.
147. See Phil Messina, Dissecting the Diallo Shooting: Four Seconds to Hell, Law
Enforcement Trainer, July-Aug. 2000, at 9.
148. Id. at 10.
149. Id. at 9.
150. Id
151. McMellon had substantial bruising on his coccyx as a result of the fall. Id.
152. Id; see also Burke, supra note 146.
153. Messina, supra note 147, at 9-10, 30.
154. See id. at 9-10.
155. See Statement of Robert Johnson, District Attorney, Bronx County (Mar. 31,
1999) (on file with the Fordhan Law Review).
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The officers were charged with second-degree murder and first-degree
reckless endangerment 156 and demonstrations expressing outrage at
the officers and the Police Department sprung up around the city.57
Because there was no question that the shooting itself was an
intentional act, the officer's only plausible defense was justification.
Some of the public reaction to the case was perhaps due to a divide
between the perceptions of police officers and those of civilians. S' s
Few in the public could understand how forty-one rounds could be
fired mistakenly, in good faith.'59 To complicate matters, the event
quickly took on tremendous political significance for various factions
in the city of New York."6
The Diallo case generated so much attention in New York City that
venue was moved upstate to Albany, where the defendants were
ultimately acquitted at the conclusion of a jury trial.161 In a post-
verdict interview, jurors' comments suggested that the critical step in
their factual analysis was understanding the perception and conduct of
a reasonable police officer under the circumstances. 162  The jurors
learned how to evaluate the officers' conduct through the testimony of
an expert witness presented by the defense. 63
Certain classes of defendants who have uncommon experience,
training, or responsibility can evidently greatly benefit from the jury's
edification. In other words, in police cases, the analysis is in effect not
addressed in light of a "reasonable person" standard, but instead a
"reasonable police officer" standard, because police officers can be
expected to behave differently than the rest of the population. 6" As
we shall see, police officers are not the only persons whose
156. See People v. Boss, 701 N.Y.S.2d 342,343 (App. Div. 1999).
157. See Mike Claffey & Bill Hutchinson, 500 Mark Day of Diallo's Slay, N.Y.
Daily News, Feb. 5, 2001, at 2, 2001 WL 4676237.
158. See Andrew Brooks & Harriet Ryan, Court TV, Behind the Badge with Your
Hand on the Trigger: Our Reporters Try Out the NYPD's 'Crisis Simulator' (stating
reporters who underwent training simulator experience found disparity between
situational judgment of police officers and civilians) (on file with the Fordham Law
Review).
159. See Messina, supra note 147, at 10, 30-33, 46, 48 (addressing common
questions and concerns surrounding the event, including the amount of elapsed time
for the shooting to occur and the officers' actions during that time).
160. See Claffey & Hutchinson, supra note 157 (indicating mayoral candidate was
booed off stage after defending "police officers in this city who are decent, caring
people").
161. See Nation's Eyes on Albany as 4 Cops Exonerated, Times Union Albany,
Dec. 31, 2000, at C1, 2000 WL 31450078.
162. See Bryan Robinson, Court TV, Diallo Jurors Say They Had No Choice But to
Acquit (describing jurors' analysis of the officers' perceptions and conduct during the
event that resulted in the shooting of Amadou Diallo) (on file with the Fordham Law
Review).
163. See John Marzulli, Diallo Case Expert to Get Cop Training Post, N.Y. Daily
News, Mar. 6, 2002, at 8, 2002 WL 3168624.
164. See Brooks & Ryan, supra note 158.
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perceptions and decisions are especially influenced by their
experiences.
D. Special Concerns in Domestic Violence Cases
Like the use of force by police, the use of force by victims of
domestic violence poses controversial legal and social issues.165
Gender norms, societal expectations, pragmatic interpretations of
legal notions of imminence, 66 and alternatives to using force 67 all
contribute to a highly complex area of use-of-force litigation.,'
Evidentiary issues concerning battered-woman syndrome, 69 the social
context of domestic violence,17 and the effect and relevance of post
traumatic stress disorder17 1  present significant challenges to
determining reasonableness.
People v. Emick1" illustrates some of the complexities, as well as
the horror, of domestic violence litigations. In Emick, the defendant
was charged with first-degree manslaughter for fatally shooting her
abuser in the head while he slept." At trial, Emick presented a
justification defense, arguing that she reasonably feared that her
abuser, Marshall Allison, planned to kill her when he awoke.7" The
evidence at trial showed that Allison had tortured Emick for years,
subjecting her to beatings, burning, whipping, torture with various
objects, and even an attempted hanging. 7" An expert testified that,
165. See Beecher-Monas, supra note 31, at 89-90 (addressing failure of courts to
recognize the impact of domestic violence in making evidentiary rulings).
166. See id at 100.
167. See id at 101-02 (arguing escape and safe retreat are frequently not available
options because of the nature of the personal relationship between the parties). But
see Todd v. State, No. 05-95-00994-CR, 1998 Tex. App. LEXIS 2419, at *7 (Tex. App.
Apr. 24, 1998) (affirming conviction of voluntary manslaughter despite testimony by
expert that, due to battered-woman syndrome, "she believed she was unable to
escape").
168. See Beecher-Monas, supra note 31, at 100-02.
169. According to clinical psychologist Lenore Walker, the syndrome consists of
three phases.
The first is a tension building phase, followed by a violent incident where the
batterer expresses uncontrollable rage, and a third phase where the batterer
expresses profound regret and intentions to reform.... Learned
helplessness, or a false perception that there is no escape, is characteristic of
Walker's syndrome theory and typifies the first two stages.
Id. at 113-14 (citing Lenore Walker, The Battered Woman Syndrome 86,96 (1984)).
170. Id. at 124-25. Beecher-Monas challenges the "bogus science" of battered-
woman syndrome and argues that courts should address the special concerns of
domestic violence victims by splitting the expert testimony into two component
parts-social context and post-traumatic stress disorder-and discarding the
"(invalid) syndrome." Id.
171. See id. at 124.
172. 481 N.Y.S.2d 552 (App. Div. 1984).
173. Id. at 553.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 557-58.
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suffering from battered-woman syndrome, Emick likely perceived no
escape from her terrible situation. 76
The perception that an attempt to escape would be futile was
especially significant because in New York, and some other
jurisdictions, there is a statutorily imposed duty to retreat under
certain circumstances."7 In New York, the duty requires that an actor
must not use deadly physical force if she can knowingly escape in
complete safety.178 At trial, Emick opposed any mention of a duty to
retreat (and the prosecution agreed) because the statute indicates that
the duty does not arise when the actor is in her home and not the
initial aggressor.179  Nevertheless, the judge insisted on including
language in the jury instruction that suggested retreat was an issue for
consideration."' 0 The jury, confused by the instruction, repeatedly
asked for clarification.
While the duty to retreat should not have been a central element to
the crime charged, the evidence at trial did address the issue of
whether Emick had realistic alternatives to killing her abuser in his
sleep." 2 Although Emick had friends and family in the vicinity who
had tried to assist her in the past, her perception was that the help
offered would not protect her from Allison.183 She had good reason to
believe so. Evidence at trial showed that Allison went to such
extreme measures as gluing the door shut when he went out, to make
sure that no one had gone in or out of the home in his absence.,"
Allison told Emick many times that if she left him, he would find her
and kill her.'85 On the night of the shooting, before going to bed,
Allison choked Emick and told her that he would kill her and her
children when he awoke. 186
According to testimony, Richard Meyers, a friend of the couple,
had visited the residence on the night of the shooting and had spoken
to Emick on several occasions about the abuse187 At trial, the jury
heard testimony that suggested it was Meyers's belief that Emick
would have to resort to killing Allison if she was ever to be free of
him, even before Allison made the specific threats on the fateful
176. Id. at 559. Dr. Matilda Rice testified that in the final stages of battered-
woman syndrome, "the wife eventually feels that she cannot escape her tormentor
and that she will be tracked down." IL
177. N.Y. Penal Law § 35.15(2)(a) (McKinney 1998).
178. Id.
179. Emick, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 560.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 554-55.
183. Id. at 554-58 (noting that offers of help by friend and a community assistance
program proved ineffective).
184. Id. at 556-57.
185. Id. at 558.
186. Id. at 557-58.
187. Id. at 556-57.
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evening."s The timing of Emick's decision to kill Allison was critical,
because the ultimate question for the jury was whether Emick had "an
honest and reasonable conviction and fear that she was about to suffer
death or serious physical injury" at the time she made the decision to
kill.189
Despite the sympathetic nature of the defendant, and the inevitable
disgust the jury must have felt towards the decedent, Emick was
convicted of first-degree manslaughter.19' On appeal, Emick argued
that the judge had improperly admitted testimony about Meyers'
belief and had also erroneously instructed the jury with respect to her
duty to retreat.191 The Appellate Division reversed the lower court
and remanded for a new trial."9 The court found that testimony
regarding Meyers's conversations with Emick could have improperly
led the jury to impute Meyers's own belief to Emick, fatally
undermining her claim that she did not formulate a plan to kill Allison
until the morning of the shooting. 3 The court explained:
Given the fact that defendant's defense of justification was based
upon her claim that she feared for her life on the morning of the
shooting, principally because of the death threat issued only a few
hours earlier by the decedent, permitting the jury to hear that
Meyers believed that... she would have to resort to killing the
decedent was extremely prejudicial to the defendant's case.""
Although the court found this evidentiary issue sufficient to warrant
reversal, they felt the retreat issue merited some discussion as well."
The court stated summarily that, because Emick was in her own
home, there was no duty to retreat, and therefore the jury charge
addressing the duty was improper.96
Emick is replete with troubling and complex issues that surround
domestic violence. For example, what practical alternatives to
counter-force existed and, if such alternatives did exist, when was the
defendant legally obligated to exercise them? Should she have been
forced to abandon her home in lieu of using force? The statute's
exception to the duty to retreat seems to champion the rights of a
resident not to be wrongfully driven out. Absent a duty to retreat,
however, could there have been any other conclusion than the death
or grave injury of one of the co-habitants? Even so, given the law of
188. Id. at 562.
189. Id at 560.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 560-61.
192- Id. at 563.
193. I. at 562.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 563.
196. Id.
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justification's philosophical premises of social utility, was the factual
outcome unjust?
While a thorough treatment of domestic violence issues is well
beyond the scope of this Note, the factual circumstances of the
incidents that result in charges raise the same questions as all use-of-
force cases: Was the conduct reasonable under the circumstances?
Because many of the factors that arise in domestic violence incidents
are common to use-of-force cases in general, the factors addressed
herein provide additional options for presenting a justification
defense.
E. Admissibility of Experts
Consultants and expert witnesses can help the attorney and the jury
better understand the circumstances of a use-of-force case. An
expert's testimony regarding a defendant's likely state of mind,
perceptions or physical capabilities can often give a much fuller
picture as to what is reasonable. While an expert can be useful
without ever taking the stand,"9 the legal standard for the admission
of an expert witness demands some attention, 98 because lawyers will
often want the expert to present evidence directly to the jury.
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,199 the Supreme
Court set forth the test for federal courts to apply in determining
whether to admit an expert. Under Daubert, the court will consider
whether a theory or technique can be tested,2°° whether it has been
subjected to peer review and publication,"' the known or potential
rate of error,2°2 and whether the science has been generally
accepted.2 3 The litigator should take care to select an expert with
solid credentials, especially because there is a growing "trend toward
increased scrutiny of experts' theories and conclusions."1'2
197. See Cynthia H. Cwik, Guarding the Gate: Expert Evidence Admissibility, Litig.,
Summer 1999, at 7.
Sometimes, you need to learn more about a technical area but you do not
need an expert witness to testify in court. Under such circumstances, a
consultant will fit the bill. A consultant is an expert who does not testify in
court, is generally not subject to discovery, and does not need to be
disclosed.
Id.
198. Id. ("[Ojnce you have decided that you need an expert and have chosen one to
testify, you must focus on the vital issue of how best to ensure that your expert's
testimony will be admitted. The touchstone for your effort will be the Daubert
decision.").
199. 509 U.S. 579 (1993); see also Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137
(1999) (extending Daubert standard to nonscientific evidence).
200. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 594.
203. Id.
204. Cwik, supra note 197, at 10.
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In light of Daubert and the various state court interpretations and
practices,20 an expert will not be permitted to testify about novel
theories. Consequently, while use-of-force instructors who have
general knowledge of the dynamics of violent encounters may be very
useful in developing case theories, they will not be permitted to testify
unless their conclusions have a basis that can satisfy the court's
scrutiny.' ° Any testimony expounding on human behavior in high-
stress situations has to be based on scientific testimony that is
"generally accepted."' 7 For trial testimony, defendants will need to
enlist the services of reputable specialists.
F. Meeting the Challenge
As we have seen, in the varying contexts of self defense, police use
of force, and domestic violence, the decisive issue on which
justification turns is essentially the same. To defend against a charge
of unlawful violence, a defendant must establish2l that the use of
force was in response to a reasonable belief that unlawful harm was
imminent, that the defendant could not feasibly exercise a safe
alternative (or was under no legal obligation to do so), and that the
amount of force used was reasonable under the circumstancesZ"N In
police cases, the officer need only show that he reasonably believed
his conduct to be lawful and appropriate based on his perception of
the totality of the circumstances..2 "  Because the defense may only be
as good as the jury instructions which frame it, a careful review of the
jury instructions is essential.11
205. See, e.g., People v. Miller, 981 P.2d 654. 659 (Colo. App. 1998) (-When
deciding whether to admit expert testimony, the trial court must consider... the
sufficiency and extent of the foundational evidence upon which the expert witness'
ultimate opinion is to be based.... "); Clemente v. Blumenberg, 705 N.Y.S.2d 792,799
(Sup. Ct. 1999) (noting that "the New York Court of Appeals has not embraced the
Daubert standard of scientific reliability, but has retained the Frye general acceptance
test. The Frye test of 'general acceptance' is one measured by the scientists of the
relevant scientific community to which it belongs").
206. See Cwik, supra note 197, at 6; see also David L Faigman et al., Legal
Standards for the Admissibility of Scientific Evidence, in Modem Scientific Evidence:
The Law and Science of Expert Testimony (2d ed. forthcoming).
207. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594.
208. In New York, the defense of justification is a defense, not an affirmative
defense so, once raised, the burden of disproving it rests with the prosecution. See,
N.Y. Penal Law 25.00(1) (McKinney 1998); Davis v. Strack. 270 F.3d 111, 124 (2d Cir.
2001); In re Y.K., 663 N.E.2d 313 (N.Y. 1996). Some states, however, consider
justification an affirmative defense which must be raised by the defendant. See, e.g.,
State ex. reL Romley v. Superior Court, 836 P.2d 445, 451 (Ariz. App. 1992) ('[Slelf-
defense is a statutory affirmative defense in Arizona ...."); People v. Miller, 981 P.2d
at 658 (explaining elements of "affirmative defense of self-defense").
209. See supra notes 83-96 and accompanying text.
210. See supra notes 117-25 and accompanying text.
211. See, eg., People v. Emick, 481 N.Y.S.2d 552 (App. Div. 1984).
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In each type of use-of-force case, the focus will be on a sequence of
events and perceptions that ultimately bear on the reasonableness and
lawfulness of the parties' conduct. Whether the analysis is subjective
(looking at the perceptions and conduct of the actual defendant) or
purely objective (from the perspective of a reasonable person under
the circumstances), perception and action are the key elements to
justification.2  Given the powerful environmental and internal
influences that affect both the mind and the body of participants in a
deadly encounter, putting the jury in the shoes of a defendant or
"reasonable person" under the circumstances may be very
challenging, but not impossible. What the litigator needs is the ability
to provide context to the events.
II. UNDERSTANDING HUMAN BEHAVIOR IN THE MIDST OF
VIOLENCE: A SCIENTIFIC APPROACH
In trying to judge the behavior of a reasonable person under
extreme circumstances, what evidence can a fact-finder rely on?
Certainly, if the defendant chooses to testify, the jury may hear about
some of the challenges to decision-making and performance that the
defendant experienced. And attorneys may make mention of these
concerns when addressing the jury.213 But to obtain an objective,
credible understanding of how a person under stress perceives and
interacts with his or her environment, we need to look beyond the
impressions of the parties and their respective counsel.
Two areas of research, each drawing on the other, provide crucial
and invaluable insight into dimensions of perception and performance
that may bear directly on a determination of what is reasonable
behavior in a violent confrontation. This part of the Note draws on
those two fields, psychology and the science of combat-survival
training, to explain what happens to a person in a life-threatening
situation.
The first section of this part provides some examples of
documented cases of perceptual distortions.214 Then this part looks at
212. For a thorough discussion of the complexities of applying a workable standard
to self-defense cases, see generally Nourse, supra note 28. Readers who find the
distinction between subjective and objective analyses troubling should take heart, for
they are not alone. Scholars have recognized that there is an inherent tension
between the supposedly objective notion of "a reasonable person under the
circumstances" and the inconsistent treatment of these situations by the courts. See id.
at 1236. In practice, the application of the doctrine is prone to misinterpretation,
inconsistencies, and contradiction. See id. at 1237.
213. For example, in the Amadou Diallo case, Stephen Worth opened for
defendant Edward McMellon by addressing issues of training, experience, and
reasonable belief based on the circumstances. Worth told the jury the officers'
decisions were based on "[r]eason, common sense, training and experience."
Transcript of Proceedings at 8, People v. Boss (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2000) (on file with the
Fordham Law Review).
214. See infra Part II.A.1.
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scientific research by psychologists as a means of explaining
perceptual phenomena .2 1  Next, this part looks at the way
professional use-of-force instructors have applied the science to
understanding the dynamics of gunfights and other high-stress,
combative situations in efforts to prepare police officers for deadly
force encounters.2 16 This part also looks at how the stress response
affects physical performance, and discusses how the changes in the
body's overall functioning can dramatically affect human behavior in
use-of-force scenarios.217
A. Emotion, Perception, and Performance
1. The Artwohl Study
Dr. Alexis Artwohl, a clinical psychologist who has treated combat
veterans and police officers as well as victims of child abuse, domestic
violence, accidents, and disasters, has recorded reports by persons
who experienced high levels of stress in use-of-force scenarios.218 Her
work has been particularly well received by the use-of-force training
community.2 19 Artwhol has found that individuals involved in such
incidents undergo profound changes.
When fear explodes inside of you, your sympathetic nervous system
instantly dumps a variety of natural drugs and hormones into your
body to cause the high arousal state .... [Ylour body operates
differently .... Besides such obvious emotional symptoms as anger
and fear, this high arousal state causes other changes that can be put
into three categories: physical, sensory/perceptual, and
cognitivelbehavioral.220
The changes Artwohl mentions result from the functioning of the
autonomic nervous system."' By interviewing people who survived
frightening, high-stress incidents, Dr. Artwhol documented reports of
the following specific perceptual changes:
a. Tunnel Vision: Tunnel vision is the result of the loss of
peripheral vision, due to changes in the way the eye transmits
information to the brain during a crisis.m" The "field of vision ...
215. See infra Part II.A.2.
216. See infra Part II.A.3.
217. See infra Part II.B.
218. Artvwohl & Christensen, supra note 3. at 263.
219. See Massad Ayoob, Portland Study Proves Mental Phenomena Occur in
Gunfights, at http://wv.maltese.net/gryphon/Gunight%20Study.htm (last visited
Nov. 6,2001).
220. Artwohl & Christensen, supra note 3, at 38.
221. Id. at 33.
222. Id. at 39 (referring to effects of "natural drugs" on vision); see also Lawrence
N. Blum, Force Under Pressure: How Cops Live and Why They Die 45 (2000)
(explaining function of limbic system); Siddle, supra note 3, at 76-77 (discussing
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narrow[s] to mere inches" and a person loses "depth perception and
[the] ability to see what is behind the threat."m
b. Hearing Distortions: The most common hearing distortion is
hearing loss," sometimes referred to as "auditory exclusion." 5
Persons experiencing auditory exclusion may not be able to
comprehend warning shouts, the sound of other people approaching,
or other information226 that could critically influence decision-
making."7
c. Time Distortion: Events may seem to occur in slow motion or,
conversely, extremely rapidly. 8 A person may even experience both
phenomena in the same event.29 This distortion is closely related to
the loss in depth perception that results from tunnel vision, confusing
the brain's ability to gauge distance and speed.20
How likely is it that a particular person experienced any or all of
these perceptual distortions during an incident? A survey of seventy-
two police officers who had been involved in critical incidents
indicates that the phenomena occur with compelling regularity.
Eighty-two percent had experienced tunnel vision. 31 Eighty-eight
percent had experienced diminished sound. 2  Time distortion
occurred as slow motion in sixty-three percent of those surveyed, and
as fast motion in seventeen percent. 3
2. Scientific Background: Why Do These Distortions Occur?
While the precise manner in which emotional states affect
perceptual and cognitive brain functioning is a controversial and
complex inquiry,2' research indicates that emotional states do
findings of sports optometrist Hal Breedlove).
223. Artwohl & Christensen, supra note 3, at 39.
224. Id. at 40.
225. Siddle, supra note 3, at 78.
226. See id.
227. See, for example, People v. Krupinski, the recent case in Detroit, Michigan
where a police officer was charged with manslaughter for shooting a rake-wielding
assailant who did not respond to verbal commands. The victim's mother repeatedly
shouted at officers, trying to explain that her son was deaf and mute, during the time
when the officers were engaged with the suspect. See John Springer, Court TV, Was
He Protecting a Fellow Officer?, at http://courttv.comltrials/krupinski/080101_ctv.html
(last visited Apr. 9, 2002).
228. Artwohl & Christensen, supra note 3, at 42.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 39.
231. Id. at 49.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 49-50.
234. See The Heart's Eye: Emotional Influences in Perception and Attention
(Paula M. Niedenthal & Shinobu Kitayama eds., 1994) [hereinafter The Heart's Eye]
(consisting of thirteen chapters by various reputable experts, each exploring and
scrutinizing the methodology and depth of research on the manner in which
emotional states influence perception, attention, and recall).
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produce physiological changes in the way the brain processes
information,. 5 and that the process is generally beyond the
individual's control. 6 Anxiety in particular, which can be reasonably
associated with use-of-force decision-making, affects how the brain
orients, prioritizes, and anticipates responses to perceived threats.,-'
Studies by psychologists show that anxiety produced by a perceived
threat results in "attentional narrowing," characterized as "an
adaptive adjustment that serves to limit the processing of less
important sources of information and to promote focused, effective
responding." 9  This adaptive adjustment, however, does not
necessarily produce the best response when situations are complexa '
or "when attention focuses on some information sources at the
expense of other relevant ones." '241
Attentional narrowing may be particularly problematic for a police
officer, who is expected to select an appropriate tool and level of force
from an incremental and multi-layered ladder of options.-- These
options include mere presence, verbal commands, use of a deterrent
spray, empty-hand physical control techniques, batons, electronic
"stun guns," and deadly force, which is typically associated with
firearms.243 The officer is supposed to match the appropriate tool or
level of force to the suspect's behavior.21 While there is a tendency
in training to equate a particular suspect's behavior with a specific
level of force,245 in reality a great deal of overlap exists, because
235. See Douglas Derryberry & Don M. Tucker, Motivating the Focus of Attention,
in The Heart's Eye, supra note 234, at 167, 188-89 (explaining physiological analysis
for influences on direction and scope of attention).
236. Marcia K. Johnson & Carolyn Weisz, Conments on Unconscious Processing:
Finding Emotion in the Cognitive Stream, in The Heart's Eye. supra note 234. at 145,
158 ("[E]motion may control our attention, even determine the product of earliest
perceptual processing. Furthermore, the impact of emotion may be automatic,
beyond control.").
237. Derryberry & Tucker, supra note 235, at 189 ("[A]nxiety facilitates
anticipatory representations of potential dangers and alternative coping options,
which are evaluated and used to set up a plan of action.").
238 Id.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 191 ("With stronger narrowing, an individual may fail to sample
adequately the entire set of possible options, perhaps considering only a small subset.
The individual may even focus on a single solution, carrying it out in an inflexible and
preservative way.").
241. Id. at 190.
242. See Faulkner, supra note 102, at 19-20 (explaining typical options an officer is
expected to employ in countering resistance).
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. See id. at 22 ("These factors rarely follow an exact pattern or order of
progression. This is why it is somewhat of an injustice to label the resistance as a
'level'.").
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deadly force can result from empty-hand techniques116 and the
suspect's behavior can change rapidly.
Attentional narrowing can also cause a person to fail to recognize
important environmental information, such as the presence of non-
participant bystanders. Heightened arousal states tend to amplify the
central stimulus, focusing a person's limited perceptual faculties on a
particular object or event.2 47 Consequently, "visual attention may
become overly focused on central targets at the expense of peripheral
targets, and object perception may emphasize local rather than global
aspects of form. '248 To invoke a common metaphor, the observer
loses sight of the forest (the global form) and sees only a single tree
(the local form). Stress brought on by participation in dangerous
situations in particular "reduces the range of cue utilization, acting
both on perception and other cognitive and conceptual skills. '249 It
becomes more difficult for the observer to mentally process the
connection between the "cue," such as the perception of the presence
of a firearm in a crowd of people, and the available and appropriate
responses. For example, the observer could lose sight of other,
equally important cues, like the presence of an innocent bystander
standing behind the threat. While the neurological processes that
produce these effects are complex, the existence of these phenomena
has been documented in participants of laboratory experiments and
target groups,20 including police officers, who have survived sudden,
violent encounters.251
3. Perceptual Distortion in Use-of-Force Incidents
Bruce Siddle, a trainer and police use-of-force expert, has sought to
explain the relationship between circumstances in use-of-force
situations and the perceptual distortions documented by Dr. Artwohl
and others. Siddle's research and methodology, developed to set
realistic training goals for survival training, focuses specifically on the
types of circumstances likely to be present in violent encounters. z2
246. See, e.g., United States v. Livoti, 22 F. Supp. 2d 235 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (finding
officer caused death through application of choke hold).
247. See Shinobu Kitayama & Susan Howard, Affective Regulation of Perception
and Comprehension: Amplification and Semantic Priming, in The Heart's Eye, supra
note 234, at 41, 43-44 (citing J.A. Easterbrook, The Effect of Emotion on Cue
Utilization and the Organization of Behavior, Psychol. Rev. 66, 183-201 (1959)).
248. Derryberry & Tucker, supra note 235, at 181.
249. Id. (citation omitted).
250. Id.
251. See Artwohl & Christensen, supra note 3, at 48-50 (providing results of survey
of seventy-two police officers who had been involved in deadly force encounters).
252. See Siddle, supra note 3, at 7 ("This text is a culmination of eight years of
research into educational psychology, neurobiology, motor learning sciences and
thousands of hours in the classroom.... My goal is to unwrap some of the mysteries
surrounding combat and survival performance, with the ultimate goal of enhancing
the survival of today's warriors."); see also Bruce K. Siddle & Dave Grossman, Effects
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Siddle's extensive research into the effects of stress delves into the
fields of psychology, sports medicine, and optometry to help explain
the causes of the phenomenaY3 Through the use of heart monitors
and other data-recording devices, Siddle has documented elevations in
heart rate and increased levels of adrenal hormones in individuals
who perceive danger.5 In response to a threat, the body prepares
large muscles for immediate use at the expense of smaller muscles and
systems.5 Siddle's research supports the proposition that, under
stress, attention is focused on the threat to the exclusion of
information that does not seem relevant to immediate survival.- 6
One of the most dramatic effects of stress is the change it induces in
the way a person takes in visual information. Dr. Hal Breedlove has
worked wvith Siddle to help understand and explain the phenomenon
of visual distortion.25 Far from atypical, visual distortions and their
effects on responsiveness are the norm in a high-stress incident,
caused by physiological changes in the way the eye works. Breedlove
and Siddle have described these changes in detail:
[T]he eyes have difficulty focusing during survival stress.
Focusing of the lens is a function of the sympathetic nervous system,
which is responsible for activities associated with survival. The lens
is normally held in a flattened, distance-viewing state by tension of
the radial ligaments. Parasympathetic excitement contracts the
ciliary muscle, which releases this tension, allowing the lens to
become more convex.?58
People under stress perceive their environment differently because
the lens through which they view the world literally changes shape.59
Additionally, the amount of available light and the distance to the
object are important factors in determining the accuracy of visual
perception5 r
For litigation purposes, it is critical that the causes of perceptual
distortion can be explained in credible, scientific principles, because
the admission of expert testimony will be much more likely if the
of Combat Stress on Performance, at http://members.home.net/alienhand/
Survival_StressReactionTraning.htm (last visited Nov. 6,2001).
253. Siddle, supra note 3, at 7.
254. Id. at 47, 76-77.
255. Id. at 47.
256. See id. at 75.
257. See Bruce Siddle & Hal Breedlove, How Stress Affects Vision and Shooting
Stances, Police Marksman, May-June 1995, at 30.
258. Id. at 30-31.
259. Id.
260. See Paul Michel, A Study in the Determination of Lethal Versus Non Lethal
Object Discrimination in Officer Involved Shootings, FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin
(addressing difficulty of distinguishing weapon from non-weapon object) (on file with
the Fordham Law Review).
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court can ascertain a reliable basis for the knowledge.26 Further,
because courts traditionally rely on notions of objectivity, 262 it may be
more persuasive to show that perceptual distortions occur because of
the human body's physiology, as opposed to one particular
defendant's unique, and therefore arguably subjective, perspective. 263
Siddle argues that perceptual narrowing can sometimes explain
what appears to be negligent or reckless behaviors .2 1 He offers the
example of an officer who shoots at a suspect with apparent disregard
for innocent bystanders because, due to the physiological stress
response he has undergone, he simply does not see or hear them. 65
B. Performance Under Stress
The defendant's perception, while important, is only half of the
equation for analyzing a use-of-force incident. The other half is the act
or acts that the defendant performs in response to the perception."'
Even if the defendant establishes that he or she held a reasonable
belief that force was justified, it is still possible that a jury will
determine that the extent or level of force employed was improper.267
Consequently, our discussion now turns to the related issue of
performance under stress which, like perception, is dramatically
affected by heart rate and related changes in the functioning of the
nervous system.268 Stress affects performance in use-of-force
situations in at least three important ways: 1) Reaction time is
increased; 2) the distance from an assailant necessary to remain safe is
greater than expected and difficult to judge; and 3) motor-skill
dexterity diminishes and may produce involuntary fist clenching.
1. Reaction Time
Reaction time affects the availability of responses that can
reasonably be performed within a given time frame.269 To have a
realistic understanding of the amount of time a person has to make a
261. See supra Part I.E (addressing standards for admissibility of expert scientific
evidence).
262. See Heller, supra note 2, at 8-9.
263. See Nourse, supra note 28, at 1240-42 (noting debate over validity of
subjective versus objective standards).
264. Siddle, supra note 3, at 75.
265. Id. at 76-77.
266. See, e.g., In re Y.K., 663 N.E.2d 313, 314 (N.Y. 1996) ("It is not enough that
the defendant believed that the use of force was necessary under the circumstances;
his reactions must be those of a reasonable person similarly confronted.").
267. For example, a person may use physical force in self-defense, but may not use
deadly physical force unless special circumstances arise. See supra notes 28-34 and
accompanying text.
268. See Siddle, supra note 3, at 45-60.
269. See id. at 67 (citing E. McGivern, Fast and Fancy Revolver Shooting (New
Win Publishing, Inc. 1984) (1932)).
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decision under stress-to shoot or not to shoot, for example-reaction
time must be considered as a separate part of the total event time,
because it occupies a period that will be spent merely recognizing the
threat. Siddle defines reaction time as "a function which occurs
between the sensory nervous system and the brain's ability to
recognize and identify a proper response.""0  The more challenging
the threat stimulus, the longer the reaction time will be.-"
In a life-or-death situation, notwithstanding the showdowns of
classic Hollywood Westerns, the individual who reacts to the other's
movement generally loses the race to "draw," especially if an assailant
produces a concealed weapon.2 -  Additionally, studies focusing
specifically on situations where a suspect is shot in the back show that
the "lag time" between the shooter's decision to pull the trigger, the
shot going off, and the subject's contemporaneous movement can
produce results that appear indicative of unjustified shootings. r
Because lag time between threat perception and response is an
inevitable condition in violent confrontations, and because the subject
can move independently, the precise placement of shots is impossible
for the shooter to control.2 74
2. Rate of Travel and Imminence: At What Distance Does an
Assailant Present an Imminent Threat?
Closely related to reaction time is the issue of an assailant's rate of
travel-the amount of elapsed time it takes for a person to close
distance 75 The assailant's rate of travel becomes particularly
important in analyzing at what distance it is reasonable to believe that
a threat is imminent. A common misperception is that a significant
distance represents a substantial amount of time and, therefore, a lack
of imminence in the threat. Many readers (and jurors) might be
surprised to learn that an individual standing thirty feet away could
pose an imminent threat2 76 in light of the Second Circuit's recent
270. Id at 62-63 (citing R. A. Schmidt, Motor Learning & Performance, From
Principles to Practice, Human Kinetics (1991)).
271. Reaction time may be increased dramatically by the environmental stressors
on the actor-as much as 400% in some instances. Siddle, supra note 3, at 76,83.
272. See Raymond P. Rheingans, Violator Movement Times vs. Officer Response
Times in Armed Encounters, PPCT Res. Rev., June 1998, at 2 (describing reaction-
time experiments that show that an "officer who is unaware of a subject's weapon
could be behind by .79 seconds or more if the subject suddenly drew his weapon").
273. See Mark Hansen, Faster than a Speeding Bullet: Study Says Quick Turns by
Suspects Can Account for Gunshot Wounds in Back, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1997, at 38,38.
274. See Lewinski, supra note 91, at 20.
275. The equation for determining the assailant's rate of travel is Rate equals
Distance divided by Time.
276. For a thorough discussion of some of the complexities and inconsistencies in
the law's treatment of the concept of imminence, see generally Nourse, supra note 28.
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finding that "one or two seconds" from harm amounts to
imminence.277
Frank Borelli, a police use-of-force researcher, has re-examined the
accepted standard of twenty-one feet as a "safe distance" in light of
experiments that consistently show a suspect's average rate-of-travel
at approximately fourteen feet per second.?8 Considering reaction
time, if an assailant charges from a distance of thirty feet, the defender
will be less than two seconds from harm by the time he realizes that he
or she is under attack. A combination of reaction time and rate-of-
travel evidence could be persuasive in showing how a defendant
reasonably perceived a threat of imminent harm from an assailant
who was a considerable distance away, perhaps armed only with a
contact weapon, such as a knife.279
3. Motor Skills
In his investigation of the effects of stress on performance, Siddle
found a direct correlation between reaction time, elevation in heart
rate, and loss in manual dexterity.
When a [person] has the advantage of time, he can prepare and plan
with clarity of mind....
In contrast, "lost time" in a survival encounter initiates a chain
reaction of escalating stress.. . . Heart rates continue to increase as
the [person] recognizes that loss of time is increasing. Finally, a
survival stress response occurs .... 280
The "survival stress response" includes changes in nervous system
function and body chemistry that produce a diminution in fine motor
skills, 1 such as shooting, turning a doorknob to escape, or even
dialing "911" on a telephone.
The more stress a person experiences, the greater difficulty he or
she will have performing complex tasks that might otherwise be
considered desirable and appropriate responses to a perceived threat.
A person will probably not be able to perform many tasks that require
fine motor skills if his or her heart rate has risen significantly.= The
277. Davis v. Strack, 270 F.3d 111, 130 (2d Cir. 2001).
278. See Frank Borelli, 21 Feet Is Way Too Close!, Law Enforcement Trainer, July-
Aug. 2001, at 12, 14 (challenging the notion that a twenty-one-foot distance between
an officer and a suspect allows the officer sufficient time to react to an attack); see
also Seth DuCharme, Sharpening Skills in Edged Weapons Defense, Law
Enforcement Tech., Jan. 1996, at 20, 20-21 (addressing misconceptions about
assailants' rate of travel).
279. See, e.g., Jamie Stockwell, Officers Kill Armed Suspect: Pr. George's Police
Say Man Had Knife, Refused to Surrender, Wash. Post, Oct. 5, 2001, at B7, 2001 WL
28362307.
280. Siddle, supra note 3, at 61.
281. Id. at 43-47.
282. See id. at 97 ("The research findings stipulate that only gross motor skills will
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more complicated the task, the less "reasonable" it becomes to
perform in a sudden, life-or-death confrontation, because the chance
that it will be performed effectively diminishes?
One final factor for consideration of the effects of stress on
performance is the "fist reflex." '  The fist reflex is the involuntary
closing of the hand as part of the body's alarm reaction. While this
reflex is instinctive, it is more likely to occur when it has become a
conditioned response to threat stimuli."-  The fist reflex could
potentially result in an accidental shooting if an officer, pointing a gun
at a suspect, is startled and the officer's hand reflexively and
unintentionally closes into a fist, thereby depressing the trigger and
discharging the weapon.
The fist reflex in the gun hand may also occur as a sympathetic
nervous-system response to the activity in the empty hand.' For
example, a person who grabs something with his or her empty hand
may unintentionally send a signal to the hand holding the gun to close
into the same position, which will often be a motion that discharges
the gun. This kind of activity is likely to occur when a person is falling
and reaches out to grab an object for balance, or is forced to grapple
with a resistive adversary with a gun in his or her hand. '
Reaction time, an assailant's rate of travel, and the effect of stress
on fine motor skills, including the fist reflex, all affect the
reasonableness of responses to a perceived threat. A defendant's
seemingly inappropriate responses may be the result of physical
limitations8 or reflexes' brought on by the stress of an encounter
and may be, in fact, quite reasonable given the circumstances. For
example, the level of accuracy one might reasonably expect from a
shooter diminishes significantly once it is recognized that shooting is a
fine motor skill that depends on eye-hand coordination.
Persons who display certain levels of technical skill under non-
stressful conditions should not be expected to reproduce the same
be able to withstand the affects of survival stress.").
283. These findings might be persuasive to explain, for example, why a defendant
struck an assailant with a telephone (gross motor skill) without first trying to dial a
number on it to call for help (fine motor skill).
284. See Phil Messina, Ready When Your Gun Goes "Bang"?, Am. Police Beat,
Oct. 2000, at 35, 35 (stating that instinctive fist reflex "can be suppressed or enhanced
through ... conditioning").
285. George Demetriou, To Punch or Not to Punch That is the Question!, Law
Enforcement Trainer, Mar.-Apr. 1994, at 46, 48 (explaining that involuntary discharge
is more likely when officers had been trained to make fists in response to threat);
Messina, supra note 284, at 35.
286. See Demetriou, supra note 285, at 48.
287. See, e.g., Kevin Flynn, Bronx Man Was Shot Up Close, Police Say, N.Y. Times,
Mar. 4, 2000, at B4, 2000 WL 16314043 (reporting unarmed drug suspect was shot
during a struggle in a stairwell).
28& See supra notes 280-84 and accompanying text.
289. See supra notes 284-87 and accompanying text.
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level of competence under extreme stress. Responses that rely on
dexterity or substantial amounts of time (more than one second, in
most circumstances) will rarely be reasonable in a critical incident
because, in all likelihood, they simply will not be reliable under stress.
In deadly force encounters, defendants may reject alternatives
instinctively, but may not be able or willing to articulate the
experience in such a way that it will be useful in developing a
justification defense.19°  To best understand the encounter, the
attorney may need to seek out the services of a use-of-force consultant
or an expert witness. Part III looks at how the science discussed
above can be, and has been, practically applied to use-of-force
litigations, at all stages of case development.
III. APPLICATION OF THE SCIENCE
This part explains how, through the use of research, consultants,
and expert witnesses, the science discussed in Part II can make a
significant difference in litigation strategy and, ultimately, in the
outcome of the case. First, this part considers the close relationship
between the science discussed previously and the legal formulations
for reasonableness.291 Second, this part looks at the complementary
but distinct roles of the consultant and the expert by providing insight
gleaned from interviews with two prominent figures in the field of use-
of-force research as it applies to litigation.29 Third, this part addresses
the application of the science to the types of cases discussed in Part
1.293 Finally, this part suggests that the role of science, whether
accessed through available research, a consultant, or an expert
witness, has a critical but limited application. The role of the research
or expert testimony is limited in that it can never replace the
responsibility for factual analysis that resides solely with the fact-
finder. By providing a context for the fact-finder's analysis, however,
the use of such scientific information may be dispositive if the ultimate
issue is the credibility of the justification defense.29
A. Providing a Context for Reasonableness
Dr. Artwohl's findings regarding perceptual distortions295 are
remarkable in light of the critical importance of the law's emphasis on
290. Psychological barriers and limitations arise not only during a deadly force
encounter, but afterwards as well. For a fascinating discussion of the innate human
resistance to killing and accurately relating the experience of killing to others, see
Dave Grossman, On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and
Society (1995).
291. See infra Part III.A.
292. See infra Part III.B.
293. See infra Part III.C.
294. See infra Part III.D.
295. See supra Part II.A.
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perception as it relates to justification."9  When the law contemplates
a reasonable person, does it contemplate that the person is likely to
experience such dramatically distorted perceptions of the world
around her? Is it fair to ignore these elements in judging an
individual's conduct? In Davis,297 for example, how much litigation
could have been avoided if the defense had been able to show at trial
the perceptual and performance factors that influenced the
defendant's decision to shoot Bubblegum? Arguably, omission of
these elements provides the fact-finder with an incomplete context in
which to make an accurate determination. The court will be reluctant
to admit assertions of the existence of these phenomena, however,
without substantial science to back them up.' As always, the court
must weigh the probative value of the evidence against the potential
for prejudice or confusion.219
Recalling the facts of Enick, ° for example, scientific evidence
certainly could have contributed to the jury's understanding of the
defendant's alternatives. Most intriguingly, arguments could have
been made regarding the practical circumstances and tactical
considerations under which the shooting took place. Would Emick
have had a stronger case if she woke her abuser first, instigating an
inevitable attack that would place her in greater danger? The
research on subject performance and behavior,;" along with the
history of the defendant's victimization,' suggest that waking the
larger, stronger abuser would have been risky at best, and contrary to
Emick's goal of protecting her life and the lives of her children.
Placing the parties outside their home, and thereby removing the
resident exception to the duty to retreat,- 3 raises even more
provocative issues. The court noted that Emick was incapable of
making her escape by car, because she did not know how to drive.3'
If she was under a duty to retreat, could she have done so in
"complete safety"? 5  Should she have tried? What would a
reasonable person do under the circumstances? The defense relied in
part on testimony regarding the effects of battered-woman syndrome,
but perhaps other evidence, such as that pertaining to reaction time or
296. See supra Part L.A-B.
297. Davis v. Strack, 270 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2001); see supra notes 59-98 and
accompanying text.
298. See supra Part I.E (addressing standards for admissibility of scientific
evidence).
299. Fed. R. Evid. 403.
300. People v. Emick, 481 N.Y.S.2d 552 (App. Div. 1984); see supra notes 172-97
and accompanying text.
301. See supra Part II.B.
302. Emick, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 553.
303. N.Y. Penal Law § 35.15(2)(a)(i) (McKinney 1998).
304. Emick, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 558.
305. N.Y. Penal Law § 35.15(2)(a); see Emick, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 558.
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rate of travel, could have offered more objective proof of justification
than the testimony offered regarding battered-woman syndrome. 06
While courts have been receptive to expert testimony regarding
battered-woman syndrome, 30 7 one commentator has suggested that
this trial tactic suffers from a perception that it demeans the client and
raises skepticism among the jurors.30 8  Because the nature of the
syndrome is controversial, 0 9 jurors who doubt the empirical basis of
the science will be reluctant to find that the syndrome justifies a
woman's distorted yet perhaps reasonable perceptions of danger.310 In
short, introducing expert testimony concerning battered-woman
syndrome can be an effective tactic, but it is evidently a double-edged
sword.31'
Litigators may wish to consider expert testimony regarding more
universal perceptual factors. Doing so would transcend gender
stereotypes and place the defendant more squarely in the territory of
objective reasonableness. Juries arguably find such testimony more
accessible and persuasive than testimony about a syndrome that they
may be predisposed to discount.3t 2
Similarly, police cases frequently present issues that are challenging
for defense attorneys to address. Research into the dynamics of
confrontations, however, can provide compelling approaches. Again,
scientific evidence about reaction time and body mechanics can help
to explain or mitigate what often seem like willful acts of unjustified
violence. In a mistaken-identity shooting of a plain-clothes New York
City police officer by other officers, a witness reported that the first
two shots fired struck the plain-clothes officer in the chest, but
306. Evidence could have suggested, for example, that Emick could not make her
escape without the risk of waking Allison and that, once awakened, Allison would be
reasonably likely to pursue Emick. Empirical evidence as common as high school
track times could show that, on average, men run faster than women and that a
reasonable woman does not "know" that she can successfully outrun a man intent on
catching and killing her.
307. Beecher-Monas, supra note 31, at 112 ("At least twelve states have statutes
mandating admissibility of expert testimony on battering in self-defense cases.
Thirty-nine states permit expert testimony on battering... ." (citing Boykins v. State,
995 P.2d 474, 476 (Nev. 2000))).
308. Id. at 114 ("[F]eminists argue that it creates an image of flawed, deranged
women overreacting to their distorted perceptions of reality.").
309. See Emick, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 559 (noting psychiatrist who testified about
battered-woman syndrome acknowledged that it "had not been completely accepted
in psychiatric circles").
310. See Beecher-Monas, supra note 31, at 115 ("[T]here is an even more
fundamental flaw with battered woman's syndrome testimony: it lacks empirical
support....").
311. Id. at 114 ("Battered woman syndrome testimony has been attacked on
several fronts.").
312. Id. at 83 n.6 ("[J]uries overwhelmingly convict even where battered woman
syndrome testimony is admitted .... " (citing Janet Parrish, Trend Analysis: Expert
Testimony on Battering and Its Effects in Criminal Cases, 11 Wis. Women's L.J. 75, 86-
87 (1996))).
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subsequent rounds struck the man as he fell.1 3 While the incident
appears to be a clear case of police misconduct, there are alternative
explanations that would be of great value to the advocate put in the
position of defending the officer who fired the rounds.
One possible explanation for the officer's continued and seemingly
unnecessary shooting is that, because of reaction time, his responses
were always a fraction of a second behind the suspect's actions, long
enough for the suspect to turn or fall before the officer's brain could
send the message to cease firing.34  Without taking into account
reaction time, juries may hold the defendant to an unrealistic and,
therefore, unreasonable standard, especially when reaction time is
considered in combination with rate of travel and body movement.315
B. Use of Scientific Research: Developing a Game Plan Based on a
Realistic Understanding of Events
Because lawyers and defendants in use-of-force cases cannot be
expected to have personal knowledge of the dynamics of violent
encounters, they may wish to enlist consultants, use-of-force experts,
optometrists, psychologists, and other specialists at the very earliest
stages of case preparation to provide information that may be useful
in developing legal arguments and defenses. Expert consultation can
also indicate when a client's version of events is improbable.316
Phil Messina, a researcher and trainer who specializes in defensive
tactics, served as a consultant to the defense team in the New York
case People v. Boss,3 17 concerning the Amadou Diallo incident
discussed in Part .318 Messina's knowledge of suspect behavior, body
motion, and perceptual distortions, as well as hundreds of experiments
and recreations he conducted at his facility, provided the defense team
with compelling avenues for formulating a justification defense that
ultimately proved successful. 319
Having filled the roles of both consultant and expert on behalf of
prosecutors, plaintiffs, and defendants, Messina draws on substantial
313. See N.Y. Officers, Commuter Wounded in Subway Gunfire, Wash. Post, Aug.
24,1994, at A9.
314. See supra notes 268-76 and accompanying text.
315. See supra Part II.B.
316. See James J. Fyfe, Police Expert Witness, 511 PLI/Lit 307, 309, 315 (1994)
(reprinted from 21 Crim. L. Bull. 515 (1985)). Fyfe, who testified for the defense in
the Amadou Diallo trial of four police officers, has recently been appointed head of
training for the New York City Police Department. See Marzulli, supra note 163, at 8.
317. 701 N.Y.S.2d 342 (App. Div. 1999).
318. Recall that culpability in the Diallo case hinged on whether it was reasonable
for four officers to fire a total of forty-one shots at a suspect in a darkened vestibule
who had reached into his pocket and withdrawn a black wallet. See supra notes 146-64
and accompanying text.
319. For a discussion of some of the issues Messina addressed in assisting the
defense, see Messina, supra note 147, at 8, 9.
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and diverse experience.32° In addressing the question of how
consultants and experts can be most effectively utilized, Messina
points out that it is important to distinguish between the function of
the consultant and the function of the expert.321 One common tactic
among litigators is to develop a theory of the case and then search for
an expert to back it up.322 Messina finds this approach problematic,
because the expert may be known for a particular view and the jury
may see the defendant as searching for a convenient, prefabricated
excuse instead of a legitimate explanation. 323
Instead, Messina suggests utilizing a consultant at the earliest stages
of the case development, because the consultant will have a broader
understanding of the factual issues involved.324 Clients who likely
suffered problematic perceptual distortions at the time the incident
took place cannot be relied on to recreate accurately the full event for
the attorney's benefit .3  They simply cannot comprehend the
complete picture.326
Once the attorney and the consultant have agreed on a plausible
theory of the incident, then the consultant may assist in locating an
expert or complementary team of experts to address the crucial
areas.3 27 Messina suggests that a number of factors can come into play
320. Messina's broad range of experience offers him a unique perspective on the
various functions of consultants and experts. In addition to serving as the lead
consultant for the criminal defendants in the Diallo case, Messina has assisted the
Queens District Attorney's Office in the prosecution of a homicidal martial arts
expert. For an example of Messina's testimony, see People v. Kempsey, No. 2174/92
(N.Y. Sup. Ct., Oct. 28, 1993) (transcript on file with the Fordham Law Review).
Messina also assisted the plaintiff's attorney for the widow of a police officer in a suit
against chemical deterrent spray manufacturers for negligent training and marketing
practices. See letter from Jeffrey S. Merrick, Attorney, Williams & Troutwine, P.C., to
Phil Messina (June 23, 1994) (concerning Ward v. Zark Int'l & Luckey Police Prod.,
No. 9303-01609 (Or. 1994)) (on file with the Fordham Law Review)).
321. Interview with Phil Messina, President, Modern Warrior Defensive Tactics
Institute, in Lindenhurst, N.Y. (Jan. 19, 2002) (notes on file with the Fordham Law
Review).
322. Id.
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. Id. Messina pointed out that persons suffering from tunnel vision, auditory
exclusion, tachepsychia, and other perceptual distortions are unable to recall all of the
details that may be important to the litigator's theory of the case. Id.
326. Id. In the Diallo case, defense attorneys were frustrated by the difficulties and
complexities of putting together a defense based on the fragmented recollections of
the four individual defendants, each of whom perceived the same event from
strikingly different perspectives. To assist the defense team, Messina constructed a
life-size recreation of the vestibule where the incident took place.
327. Id. Given the variety of relevant performance and perception factors,
different experts will likely be needed to address the different areas. For example, to
recreate the context of the event for the jury, a team might consist of an
opthamologist to address visual acuity, a psychologist to address cognitive
functioning, a medical doctor to explain the effects of epinephrine and other stress
hormones, and a motor-skills trainer to explain biomechanics and movement.
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in selecting the experts, particularly the experts' performance in
previous trials.3" Echoing the axiom of the law of evidence that "a
brick is not a wall,"329 Messina describes the role of the consultant as
helping to "fill in the mortar between the bricks."3 ' "The jury," he
says, "wants to be able to see the whole picture. Consultants and
experts can help the lawyer paint that picture." "I To get the picture
to the jury, the lawyer may rely on the consultant's assistance in
developing the narrative that will be presented on opening and in
summation. During case development and throughout the trial, the
consultant can assist the attorney in developing a comprehensive
approach to the argument. The consultant is able to see the
relationships between the issues that the various experts address.
Working together, the consultant and attorney can present a case in
which the experts fill in missing pieces until the jury has gathered
enough information to make an accurate determination of
reasonableness under the circumstances.
C. The Role of the Expert Witness at Trial
At trial, the expert can provide a compelling, authoritative
contribution to the narrative that unfolds. One expert witness who
has proven valuable in use-of-force cases is Dr. Bill Lewinski, a
professor and researcher at Minnesota State University." Dr.
Lewinski has testified effectively in use-of-force cases on the issues of
perception and performance under stress.33 Lewinski emphasizes that
the challenge in a deadly force case is to help the jury understand how
a person perceives and recalls the details of a life-threatening
328. Id. For the Diallo case, the defense team was acutely aware of the controversy
in the public and the media that went well beyond the facts of that particular case. To
counter the prejudice against the defendants, the defense presented a highly credible
expert, selecting an expert who was known for testifying against police officers in civil
suits. See generally, Fyfe, supra note 316, at 307 (revealing perspective on police use-
of-force litigation).
329. See Fed. R. Evid. 401 advisory committee's note; see also United States v.
Porter, 881 F.2d 878, 887 (10th Cir. 1989) ("'An item of evidence, being but a single
link in the chain of proof, need not prove conclusively the proposition for which it is
offered.... It is enough if the item could reasonably show that a fact is slightly more
probable than it would appear without that evidence.... A brick is not a wall.'"
(quoting 1 McCormick on Evidence § 185, at 542-43 (E. Cleary, 3d ed. 1984) (second
alteration in original) (footnotes omitted in original))).
330. Interview with Phil Messina, supra note 321.
331. Id.
332. Dr. Lewinski has drawn on his professional experiences and research as a
psychiatric social worker, counselor, and law enforcement trainer in assisting litigators
in several state and federal use-of-force cases. See Resume of Dr. William Lewinski,
at http://www.mankato.msus.edul/dept/psle/fac/Lewinski.html (last visited Apr. 8,
2002).
333. See, eg., Fuentes v. Thomas, 107 F. Supp. 2d 1288 (D. Kan. 2000): Marie
McCain, Expert Defends Roach's Decision, Cincinnati Enquirer, Sept. 21, 2001,
http://enquirer.comeditions2001/092111oc-expert-defends.htm (reporting on
Lewinski's role in People v. Roach).
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incident.334 Evidence regarding the factors that affect perception may
offer the jury a critical context in which to judge the credibility of the
defendant's testimony.
In Fuentes v. Thomas,335 for example, Dr. Lewinski's testimony
contributed to a jury finding in favor of a police officer who had shot
and killed a suspect during service of a warrant.336 The estate of the
suspect, Fuentes, sued Officer Thomas for using excessive force.337
The plaintiff claimed Thomas fired two rounds that caused Fuentes to
drop his gun, then paused before firing the third, fatal round.3
Thomas, taking the stand in his own defense, testified that he had
"locked eyes" with the suspect as he fired his weapon. 39 One of the
three shots Thomas fired, however, struck Fuentes in the side, and
another struck him in the back. 4 The plaintiff argued that, because
the suspect had been hit in the side and back, Thomas must be lying,
because he could not have maintained eye contact with a person who
had turned away from the gunfire? 41
Dr. Lewinski was admitted to testify for the defense on the issues of
perception and suspect behavior.34 Lewinski testified that Thomas's
recollection of the event was consistent with principles of attentional
narrowing and subject behavior.341 Lewinski explained that there
were several important, interrelated issues. First, Thomas's
perception of seeing only the suspect's eyes was consistent with the
phenomenon of "tunnel vision."'  Second, the jury needed some
understanding of the manner and speed by which Thomas operated
his weapon.345 Third, Lewinski addressed the speed and mechanics of
the suspect's ability to turn his body. 46 Finally, the expert offered an
explanation as to how these factors fit into Thomas's recollection of
the event.347
Lewinski described the process as follows: Thomas saw Fuentes,
and his vision narrowed down so that he perceived only the suspect's
334. Lewinski Interview, supra note 6.
335. 107 F. Supp. 2d 1288 (D. Kan. 2000).
336. See Tim Hrenchir, Topeka Police Officer Receives 'Top Cop' Award, Topeka
Capital-Journal, Oct. 2, 1998, http:/lcjonline.comlstories/100298/com-police.shtml.
337. Fuentes, 107 F. Supp. 2d. at 1291.
338. Id. at 1294; see also Sgt. Dave Thomas Cleared in Excessive Force Case, at
http://www.kscoplaw.com/goodnews.html. [hereinafter Thomas Cleared].
339. Lewinski Interview, supra note 6.
340. Fuentes, 107 F. Supp. 2d at 1294.
341. Lewinski Interview, supra note 6.
342. Id. Significantly, Lewinski passed the federal district court's application of the
Daubert test, an encouraging sign toward the application of this type of psychological
and physiological research to the area of use of force.
343. Id.
344. Id.
345. Id. In experiments conducted by the defense, Thomas found that he typically
fired three shots from his service pistol in nine-tenths of a second.
346. Id.; see also Thomas Cleared, supra note 338.
347. Lewinski Interview, supra note 6.
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eyes348 Next, his attention shifted to his own weapon, which he
accurately fired in Fuentes's direction. While Thomas was cognitively
occupied with shooting, however, Fuentes was not frozen in time or
motion, he was naturally reacting to the gunfire coming in his
direction, and he either flinched or intentionally turned away from the
shots, completing a 360-degree turn. During the approximately nine-
tenths of a second it took for Thomas to fire the rounds, Fuentes was
able to turn his body completely around, ultimately appearing to
present the same frontal angle as the one Thomas initially
perceived? 49 Thomas was apparently unaware of Fuentes's spinning
motion, and of his own perceptual shifts. Lewinski said that it is
typical for a person to have a distorted recollection of events. The
person places emphasis on the focus of the attentional narrowing (the
suspect's eyes) as opposed to the contemporaneous operation of the
weapon and the suspect's movement.5 0
After the trial was over, defense attorney David R. Cooper
interviewed the jurors about the case.35' The defense team learned
that Lewinski's testimony had been critical in the jury's assessment of
Officer Thomas's credibility.352 Without it, they would have had no
way to understand Thomas's insistence that he was locked eye to eye
throughout the shooting. -1 3  Lewinski's testimony helped the jury
understand how Thomas's perceptions and recollections of events
could have been distorted under the circumstances of the shooting.
Thomas's testimony was perplexing given the wound ballistics, yet
Lewinski showed that he could nevertheless have been confused
about his visual focus and still have acted reasonably and lawfully
under the circumstances.3 - Dr. Lewinski has proven similarly
effective in other cases.355
While most use-of-force experts probably know something about
many of the various phenomena discussed in Part II, the court will
only accept testimony from an expert who has researched,
documented, and published specific, credible findings.356
348. Id.
349. Id.; see also Lewinski, supra note 91, at 20; Hansen, supra note 273, at 38:
McGuinness, Shootings, supra note 100, at 22 ("[Ilt is not unusual for [justified] shots
to enter a suspect in the side or in the back.").
350. Lewinski Interview, supra note 6.
351. Id.
352. Id.
353. Id.
354. Id.
355. See, e.g., McCain, supra note 5 (crediting the testimony of Dr. Lewinski and
opthamologist Dr. Paul Michel with persuading jury to acquit police officer who shot
an unarmed man); see also Robert E. Pierre, Officer is Acquitted in Killing that Led to
Riots in Cincinnati, Judge: Shooting Death Wasn't Criminal, Wash. Post, Sept. 27,
2001, at A2.
356. For example, a board certified therapeutic optometrist such as Dr. Paul
Michel has developed expertise not only in his field of optometry, but also the
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Consequently, litigators should look closely at the qualifications and
professional accomplishments of prospective experts. It is also
important to investigate whether the expert has a good ethical and
professional reputation. 7
D. Limitations and Concerns
Should defendants be liable or culpable for the dangerous conduct
that may result from their mistaken beliefs? Attentional narrowing is
not dispositive, it may be just one factor among the "totality of
circumstances," but it seems logical that an inquiry into a defendant's
reasonableness should consider perceptual distortions in evaluating
the defendant's conduct and the credibility of his or her testimony.
With respect to proving state of mind elements, such as willfulness,
recklessness, or negligence, evidence of perceptual distortions could
conceivably tilt the scales in the defendant's favor.
The studies discussed above show that individuals in dangerous
situations are likely to experience dramatic perceptual distortions that
will directly affect their ability to see, hear, and comprehend
environmental stimuli. Given the law's emphasis on a defendant's
reasonable belief in use-of-force cases,358 perceptual distortions can
offer a compelling explanation of seemingly irrational or culpable
behavior. If a defendant has a reasonable but mistaken359 perception
of imminent harm and fails to notice sights or sounds that would
otherwise prohibit the use of force, justification may still be a valid
defense.36 Justification, however, does not depend solely on an
explanation of the perception. The defendant must show a logical
application of that science to use-of-force scenarios. Dr. Michel has researched and
published extensively on perceptual distortions in violent encounters, and has testified
and consulted in several use-of-force litigations, including Idaho v. Horiuchi, 215 F.3d
986 (9th Cir. 2000) (affirming the acquittal of an FBI sniper who shot and killed an
unarmed woman); see also resume of Dr. Paul Michel (on file with the Fordham Law
Review).
357. Expert witnesses frequently suffer from the stigma of being a hired gun. To
overcome this stigma at trial, the attorney should carefully investigate the expert's
background for personal and professional issues that could impeach their credibility
at trial. See generally Steven Lubet, Expert Witnesses: Ethics and Professionalism, 12
Geo. J. Legal Ethics 465 (1999); Justin P. Murphy, Expert Witnesses at Trial: Where
Are the Ethics?, 14 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 217 (2000) (addressing stigmas associated
with expert witness testimony).
358. See supra Part I.
359. See Schwartz et al., supra note 2, at 102 ("The privilege [of self-defense] exists
when the defendant reasonably believes that the force is necessary to protect himself
against battery, even though there is in fact no necessity.").
360. See, e.g., People v. Boss, 701 N.Y.S.2d 342 (App. Div. 1999) (addressing
circumstances in case where police officers raised defense of justification to charge of
murder for shooting unarmed man, based on erroneous belief that the wallet in his
hand was a gun); see also Lynne Duke, Jury Acquits 4 N.Y. Officers: Panel Rules
Police Acted Reasonably in Slaying of Amadou Diallo, Wash. Post, Feb. 26, 2000, at
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relationship between the belief and the action he or she took in
response to that perception. 361
Studies like those conducted by Bruce Siddle and Phil Messina
show that performance, like perception, is seriously influenced by
stress in violent confrontations.362 In considering the reasonableness
of a defendant's conduct, especially in terms of the selection of
alternative options, evidence of performance considerations such as
reaction time, rate of travel, body mechanics, and refledve responses
can all be compelling and probative. It may be that, in many
situations, prevalent expectations and preconceptions of appropriate
behavior are inconsistent with the physiological realities in a life and
death struggle.
Finally, litigators should consider the limitations and purpose of
expert testimony. Testimony regarding perception and performance
provides a useful context to determine credibility of witnesses and
offers plausible explanations for seemingly irrational behavior, but it
is neither practically nor legally sufficient to resolve the ultimate
question at issue.36  In all likelihood, the expert's testimony will
merely offer scientific facts from which the jury may infer favorable
findings about some elements of a client's behavior or credibility.
Because the science generally shows that perception and
performance are diminished, witness credibility may also be adversely
affected if the witness is claiming accurate and complete recall of
events. The potential accuracy or fallibility of eyewitness testimony is
a controversial and evolving issue, and is far from settled.-'
Additionally, there is some disagreement among psychologists as to
the reliability and sufficiency of research into eyewitness perception.'
In a broader sense, the recognition of perceptual distortions may
further challenge the already shaky premise that any such inquiry into
361. See Nourse, supra note 28, at 1239 (stating that "response [must be] both
necessary and proportionate").
362 See supra Part II.B.
363. See, e.g., Hygh v. Jacobs, 961 F.2d 359, 363-64 (2d Cir. 1992). In Hygh, the
plaintiff sued a police officer for civil rights violations, including excessive force,
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. A use-of-force expert for the plaintiff testified that the officer
struck the plaintiff with a flashlight, and that in so doing he used deadly physical force
unreasonably. Id. The Second Circuit was troubled by the legally conclusory nature
of the expert's testimony. The Court found that "[the expert] testified that Jacobs'
conduct was not justified under the circumstances ..... [This] testimony regarding the
ultimate legal conclusion entrusted to the jury crossed the line and should have been
excluded." Id at 364 (internal quotations omitted).
364. See, e.g., Thomas Dillickrath, Expert Testimony on Eyewitness Identification:
Admissibility and Alternatives, 55 U. Miami L. Rev. 1059 (2001); Deborah Davis &
William C. Follette, Foibles of Witness Memory for TruamaticHigh Profile Events, 66
J. Air L. & Com. 1421 (2001).
365. Howard Egeth, Emotion and the Eyewitness, in The Heart's Eye, supra note
234, at 245, 257 ("[I]t is still too soon to tell juries anything useful about the effects of
arousal on the accuracy of eyewitness testimony.").
2002] 2559
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
the circumstances of a violent confrontation may be truly objective. 66
Existing axioms of self-defense law may suffer from an increasing lack
of certainty, and the practice of law in the area of self-defense may
become less and less predictable.
Nonetheless, in the absence of scientific evidence about human
behavior and perception in violent situations, jurors are left to
speculate about a host of critical issues, such as the feasibility of
alternatives, the likely sufficiency or insufficiency of the amount of
force applied, and the credibility of a defendant's narrative, to name
but a few. While each use-of-force case is unique on its facts, the
science shows that there are general principles that can and should be
applied to an analysis aimed at determining reasonableness in extreme
circumstances.
CONCLUSION
While different types of use-of-force cases involve distinct legal and
factual concerns, the common thread that runs through them is the
inquiry into the reasonableness of specific conduct under
extraordinary circumstances. To justify or mitigate the often
unsettling nature of a use of force, a defendant must show that her
response was both reasonable and appropriate, whether based on her
own belief (subjective inquiry) or on the belief of a reasonable person
under the same circumstances (objective inquiry). Under either
standard, however, the jury ultimately must judge whether the
perceptions, beliefs, and responses in question were proper.
Scientific researchers have developed a body of knowledge that can
assist the fact-finder in the determination of reasonableness. To
perform a reasonableness analysis absent consideration of the
profound effects of stress on perception and performance denies the
jury relevant and probative contextual information. At the very least,
the lawyer trying the case should be aware of such factors in
developing a case strategy. The application of scientific evidence,
through available scientific research, consultants, and expert
witnesses, can lead to fairer findings in self-defense, police use-of-
force, and domestic violence cases. In fact, such evidence may be
applicable to all types of cases where critical decisions are made under
extreme stress.
366. See Nourse, supra note 28, at 1237 ("The law of self-defense... is far from as
settled or coherent as it is assumed to be; its meaning and theory remain ... largely
unresolved. What seems so objective-the status quo-turns out to be a good deal
more complex and contingent than has been assumed.").
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